

# Prejudice and Discrimination

*If we were to wake up some morning and find that everyone was the same race, creed and color, we would find some other cause for prejudice by noon.*

—George Aiken



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The seeds for conflict and prejudice were planted somewhere in the hills of Palmyra, New York, in 1830. There a young man named Joseph Smith, Jr., received a vision from the angel Moroni. Centuries before, Moroni, as a priest of the Nephites, wrote the history of his religion on a set of golden plates and buried them in the hills of Palmyra. When Moroni appeared to Smith, he revealed the location of the plates and gave him the ability to transcribe the ancient writings into English. This translated text became the *Book of Mormon*, the cornerstone of the Mormon religion. The *Book of Mormon* contained many discrepancies from the Bible. For example, it suggested that God and Jesus Christ were made of flesh and bone.

The conflicts between this newly emerging religion and established Christianity inevitably led to hostile feelings and attitudes between the two groups. Almost from the moment of Joseph Smith's revelations, the persecution of the Mormons began. Leaving Palmyra, the Mormons established a settlement in Kirtland, Ohio, in 1831, but it was a disaster. The Mormons didn't fit in well with the existing community. For example, the Mormons supported the Democratic Party, whereas most of the Christian population in Kirtland supported the Whigs. Mormonism also was a threat to the colonial idea of a single religion in a community. At a time when heresy was a serious crime, the Mormons were seen as outcast heretics. As a result, the Mormons were the targets of scathing newspaper

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### Key Questions


As you read this chapter, find the answers to the following questions:

1. How are prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination defined?
2. What is the relationship among prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination?
3. What evidence is there for the prevalence of these three concepts from a historical perspective?
4. What are the personality roots of prejudice?
5. How does gender relate to prejudice?
6. What are the social roots of prejudice?
7. What is modern racism, and what are the criticisms of it?
8. What are the cognitive roots of prejudice?
9. How do cognitive biases contribute to prejudice?
10. Are stereotypes ever accurate, and can they be overcome?
11. How do prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals differ?
12. What is the impact of prejudice on those who are its target?

13. How can a person who is the target of prejudice cope with being a target?
14. What can be done about prejudice?
15. How did the U.S. Army reduce prejudice?

Historically, the Mormons have been the target of prejudice. In 1873, Missouri Governor Boggs authorized the state militia to expel Mormons from the state.

Source: Everette Historical/Shutterstock.



articles that grossly distorted their religion. Mormons were socially ostracized, were denied jobs, became the targets of economic boycotts, and lived under constant threat of attack.

Because of the hostile environment in Kirtland, the Mormons moved on, splitting into two groups. One group began a settlement in Nauvoo, Illinois, and the other in Independence, Missouri. In neither place did the Mormons find peace. Near Nauvoo, for example, a Mormon settlement was burned to the ground, and its inhabitants were forced to take cover in a rain-soaked woods until they could make it to Nauvoo. At the Independence settlement in 1833, Mormon Bishop Edward Partridge was tarred and feathered after refusing to close a store and print shop he supervised. The tensions in Missouri grew so bad that then Governor Lilburn W. Boggs issued the following order: “The Mormons must be treated as enemies and must be exterminated or driven from the State if necessary, for the public peace” (Arrington & Bitton, 1979).

As a result of the prejudice experienced by the Mormons, they became more clannish, trading among themselves and generally keeping to themselves. As you might imagine, this further enraged the Christian community that hoped to benefit economically from the Mormon presence. It was not uncommon for Mormons to become the targets of vicious physical attacks or even to be driven out of a territory. There was even talk of establishing an independent Mormon state, but eventually, the Mormons settled in Utah.

The fate of the Mormons during the 1800s eerily foreshadowed the treatment of other groups later in history (e.g., Armenians in Turkey, Jews in Europe, ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia). How could the Mormons have been treated so badly in a country with a Constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion and founded on the premise of religious tolerance?

Attitudes provide us with a way of organizing information about objects and a way to attach an affective response to that object (e.g., like or dislike). Under the right circumstances, attitudes predict one’s behavior. In this chapter, we explore

a special type of attitude directed at groups of people: prejudice. We look for the underlying causes of incidents such as the Mormon experience and the other acts of prejudice outlined. We ask: How do prejudiced individuals arrive at their views? Is it something about their personalities that leads them to prejudice-based acts? Or do the causes lie more in the social situations? What cognitive processes cause them to have negative attitudes toward those they perceive to be different from themselves? How pervasive and unalterable are those processes in human beings? What are the effects of being a target of prejudice and discrimination? What can we do to reduce prejudice and bring our society closer to its ideals?

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## The Dynamics of Prejudice, Stereotypes, and Discrimination

When we consider prejudice we really must consider two other interrelated concepts: stereotyping and discrimination. Taken together, these three make up a triad of processes that contribute to negative attitudes, emotions, and behaviors directed at members of certain social groups. First, we define just what social psychologists mean by the term *prejudice* and the related concepts of stereotype and discrimination.

### Prejudice

The term **prejudice** refers to a biased, often negative, but sometimes positive attitude toward a group of people. Prejudicial attitudes include belief structures, which contain information about a group of people, expectations concerning their behavior, and emotions directed at them. When negative prejudice is directed toward a group, it leads to prejudgment of the individual members of that group and negative emotions directed at them as well. It is important to note that the nature of the emotion directed at a group of people depends on the group to which they belong (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). In fact, Cottrell and Neuberg have constructed “profiles” characterizing the emotions directed at members of various groups. For example, African Americans (relative to European Americans) yield a profile showing anger/resentment, fear, disgust, and pity. In contrast, Native Americans mostly elicited pity with low levels of anger/resentment, disgust, and fear.

Prejudice also involves cognitive appraisals that are tied to different emotions directed at members of stigmatized groups (Nelson, 2002). For example, fear might be elicited if you find yourself stranded late at night in a neighborhood with a sizeable minority population. On the other hand, you might feel respect when at a professional meeting that includes members from that very same minority group. In short, we appraise (evaluate) a situation and experience an emotion consistent with that appraisal. This can account for the fact that we rarely exhibit prejudice toward all members of a stigmatized group (Nelson, 2002). We may display prejudice toward some members of a group, but not toward others in that group.

Of course, prejudice can be either positive or negative. Fans of a particular sports team, for example, are typically prejudiced in favor of their team. They often believe calls made against their team are unfair, even when the referees are being impartial. Social psychologists, however, have been more interested in prejudice that involves a negative bias—that is, when one group assumes the worst about another group and may base negative behaviors on these assumptions. It is this latter form of prejudice that is the subject of this chapter.

In addition to being either positive or negative, prejudice can also be explicit or implicit (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). *Explicit prejudice* is overt and easily detectable. For example, a person in a Ku Klux Klan or Nazi uniform is easily spotted as having prejudices. In these instances, the prejudiced individuals are readily displaying their prejudicial attitudes. On the other hand, *implicit prejudice* is more subtle and not as easily spotted. Implicit prejudice is often activated automatically when a member of a stereotyped group is encountered. The individual directing the prejudice


**prejudice** A biased attitude, positive or negative, based on insufficient information and directed at a group, which leads to prejudgment of members of that group.



## What Exactly Does *Race* Mean?

People perceive and categorize others as members of racial groups and often act toward them according to cultural prejudices. In this social sense, race and racism are very real and important factors in human relations. When we refer to *race* in this book, such as when we discuss race-related violence, it is this socially constructed concept, with its historical, societal, and cultural significance, that we mean.

Prejudice comes in a variety of forms, the most visible of which are racism and sexism. *Racism* is the negative evaluation of others primarily because of their skin color. It includes the belief that one racial group is inherently superior to another. *Sexism* is the negative evaluation of others because of their gender (Lips, 1993). Of course, other forms of prejudice exist, such as religious and ethnic prejudice, and homophobia (negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians), and transphobia (prejudice against transgender individuals).



In this book, we use the scientific definitions of prejudice, racism, and discrimination avoiding the more politicized ones we encounter regularly.

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and applications can serve to diminish the true meaning and problem of prejudice. In this chapter and throughout this book, we use the scientific definitions of prejudice and racism, avoiding the more politicized ones we encounter regularly.

Part of the reason for the politicization of prejudice is because Western culture has primed us to think of prejudice in terms of certain groups being the perpetrators of prejudice and other groups being the targets of prejudice. For example, it is common to think of Whites as being perpetrators of prejudice against Blacks or for Christians to direct prejudice against Muslims. However, none of us is immune to prejudice. As you will learn in this chapter, prejudice has many causes. Prejudice can be learned, it can be the result of our social histories, and it can result from how we think about ourselves and even how we process information. Because prejudice has such diverse causes, some of which are the result of the way our minds process information, we are all influenced by race to some extent. Even though we all can fall prey to prejudicial attitudes, the psychological literature has focused on White prejudice toward Blacks. This has occurred primarily because the prejudice of Whites against Blacks has historically been a larger societal problem than the reverse. That is, in the past, White prejudice was institutionalized into laws that systematically oppressed Blacks for generations (e.g., slavery, Jim Crow). The relative lack of interest in Black prejudice isn't because it does not exist. There is evidence, for example, that Blacks can direct prejudice against Whites (Stephan et al., 2002; Montieth & Spicer, 2000). Stephan et al. found that Black college students had more negative racial attitudes toward Whites and perceived greater status differences between racial groups than White students. Montieth and Spicer reported that even though both Whites and Blacks expressed generally positive interracial attitudes, Blacks (especially students at a historically Black college) expressed more negative feelings toward Whites than Whites did toward Blacks. Johnson and Leci (2003) looked at the dimensions underlying Black on White prejudice and found the following four:

1. Expectation of racism from Whites, which includes beliefs such as Whites wanting to return to pre-civil rights days and Whites supporting the views of racist political groups
2. Negative beliefs about Whites, such as Whites destroying things made by Blacks and the success of Whites being due to their color
3. Negative beliefs about interracial relationships, including the beliefs that Whites are responsible for the problems of Blacks and looking negatively at interracial relationships
4. Negative verbal expressions toward Whites, including having referred to Whites as “crackers” and speaking negatively about Whites

There is also evidence for prejudice among Blacks relating to a skin tone bias. The *skin tone bias* (also called *colorism*) is a bias that Blacks (and Whites) show toward other Blacks based on the tone of their skin. Generally, the bias is that darker-skinned Blacks are perceived more negatively than lighter-skinned Blacks (Maddox, 2004; Maddox & Gray, 2002). For example, Maddox and Gray found that Blacks and Whites ascribed more negative stereotypes and characteristics to darker-skinned than lighter-skinned Blacks. Brown (1998) found that compared to darker-skinned Blacks, lighter-skinned Blacks were more likely to have higher income (on average 65% higher), more likely to be employed (especially in a profession), and that lighter-skinned Black women are seen as more attractive. Also, research has shown that the skin tone bias operates on an implicit level as well as an explicit level (White-Means et al., 2009).

Maddox argues that this skin tone bias is the result of Blacks living in a culture that values White skin tones and Blacks internalizing these values. As you can see, prejudice is a complex issue; even Blacks can hold anti-Black attitudes. Further, the skin tone bias is not limited to the United States and Blacks. Analyzing existing data from the Implicit Association Test (IAT), Jacqueline Chen and Andrew Francis-Tan (2021) found a skin tone bias among Asians. In their study, they looked at implicit skin tone bias directed at Asian targets in a number of regions across the globe and found that implicit skin tone bias



was the highest in East Asia and the lowest in the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. They also found that males showed more implicit skin tone bias in all regions except for East Asia (where males and females showed equal bias). Chen and Francis-Tan conducted a series of experimental studies looking at explicit skin tone bias. Participants evaluated job applicant profiles on a number of dimensions (e.g., competence and attractiveness). Each profile included a photograph of the applicant that was computer manipulated to vary skin tone (light, medium, dark). The results showed that female participants rated a dark-skinned applicant as less competent and less attractive than a light-skinned applicant. Male participants did not show this bias. The skin tone bias shows how complex prejudice and issues of race can be. Understanding these complexities, rather than superficially casting aspersions of racism, will be needed to truly address the problems of race and prejudice.

The skin-tone bias means that Blacks and Whites show a preference for Blacks with a lighter skin tone over those with a darker skin tone.

Source: Bricolage/Shutterstock.

## Stereotypes

Prejudicial attitudes do not stem from perceived physical differences among people, such as skin color or gender. Rather, prejudice relates more directly to the characteristics we assume members of a different racial, ethnic, or other group have. In other words, it relates to the way we think about others.

People have a strong tendency to categorize objects based on perceptual features or uses. We categorize chairs, tables, desks, and lamps as *furniture*. We categorize love, hate, fear, and jealousy as *emotions*. And we categorize people on the basis of their race, gender, nationality, and other obvious features. Of course, categorization is adaptive in the sense that it allows us to direct similar behaviors toward an entire class of objects or people. We do not have to choose a new response each time we encounter a categorized object.

Categorization is not necessarily the same as prejudice, although the first process powerfully influences the second. We sometimes take our predisposition to categorize too far, developing rigid and overgeneralized images of groups. This rigid categorization—this rigid set of positive or negative beliefs about the characteristics or attributes of a group—is a **stereotype** (Judd & Park, 1993; Stangor & Lange, 1994). For example, we may believe that all lawyers are smart, a positive stereotype; or we may believe that all lawyers are devious, a negative stereotype. Many years ago, the political journalist Walter Lippmann (1922) aptly called stereotypes “pictures in our heads.” When we encounter someone new who has a clear membership in one or another group, we reach back into our memory banks of stereotypes, find the appropriate picture, and fit the person to it. But, as we shall see, stereotypes play more roles than just being pictures in our heads.


In general, stereotyping is simply part of the way we do business cognitively every day. It is part of our cognitive “toolbox” (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). We all have made judgments about individuals (Boy Scout leader, police officer, college student, feminist) based solely on their group membership. Stereotyping is a time saver; we look in our toolbox, find the appropriate utensil, and characterize a person. For example, if we meet someone new who is a college student, we will use our internalized image of what we believe to be true of a college student and characterize the person as a *college student*. It certainly takes less time and energy than trying to get to know that person (individuation; Macrae et al., 1994). Again, this is an example of the cognitive miser at work. Of course, this means we will make some very unfair, even destructive judgments of individuals. All of us recoil at the idea that we are being judged solely on the basis of some notion that the evaluator has of group membership.

**stereotype** A set of beliefs, positive or negative, about the characteristics or attributes of a group, resulting in rigid and overgeneralized images of members of that group.

The Content of Stereotypes

What exactly constitutes a stereotype? Are all stereotypes essentially the same? What kinds of emotions do different stereotypes elicit? The answers to these questions can inform us on the very nature of stereotypes. Regardless of the actual beliefs and information that underlie a stereotype, there appear to be two dimensions underlying stereotypes: warmth (liking or disliking) and competence (respect or disrespect) (Fiske, 2012; Fiske et al., 2002). According to this *stereotype content model* (Fiske, 2012), these two dimensions combine to define different types of stereotypes. For example, high warmth and high competence yield a positive stereotype involving admiration and pride. Low warmth and low competence results in a negative stereotype involving resentment and anger. Finally, there can be mixed stereotypes involving high competence and low warmth or low competence and high warmth. According to Fiske, members of our own group and groups similar to our own are typically higher on the dimensions of warmth and competence. Conversely, members of groups that are different from our own are lower on warmth and competence. Consequently, positive feelings are directed at members of our group and negative feelings toward members of other groups. In addition to applying to groups typically thought of as being targets of stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Jews, Blacks, Asians, etc.), these dimensions can also be used to describe perceptions of individuals with mental illnesses (Sadler et al., 2012). As shown in Figure 4.1, various disorders are characterized by differing mixes of warmth and competence. For example, disorders characterized as low on warmth and high on competence are sociopaths and violent criminals. People with eating disorders, depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder are characterized as high in both competence and warmth. Finally, social class seems to be an area where there are mixed stereotypes involving high competence and low warmth or low competence and high warmth. Wealthy people are viewed as high in competence but cold, whereas poorer people are viewed as less competent but warmer (Durante et al., 2017).

Does the content of stereotypes affect a person’s behavior? Research suggests that it does. David Rast and his colleagues (2018) conducted a study of Asian minority members working for a large international corporation in the United Kingdom. Participants completed a survey of their experiences as minorities working as immigrants in a foreign country. Rast et al. obtained measures of the participants’ perception of the warmth and competence of their majority group coworkers, the degree of uncertainty they felt, and their willingness to interact with their majority group coworkers. Rast et al. found that participants’ willingness



**FIGURE 4.1**  
Competence and warmth of individuals with mental disorders.  
Based on data from Sadler et al. (2012).




to interact with their majority coworkers related to the perceived competence and warmth of the coworkers. Participants indicated that they were more willing to interact with majority coworkers when competence was high, especially when warmth was low. Participants were less willing to interact with majority coworkers when they perceived them to be incompetent and cold. In another study, Milena Micevski et al. (2021) found that Hungarian citizens expressed a stronger intention to visit tourist destinations for which they held stereotypes of high competence and high warmth. The impact of competence and warmth on intentions to visit a country was indirect, working through eliciting positive emotions. In other words, high competence and warmth elicit positive affect, which then increases the intention to visit a country. In a world in which people are living in increasingly diverse situations, it is important to understand how stereotypes relating to perceived warmth and competence can affect their interactions with others. For example, understanding how minority members perceive majority coworkers can help facilitate interactions between groups.

### Explicit and Implicit Stereotypes

Stereotypes, like prejudicial attitudes, exist on the explicit and implicit level. *Explicit stereotypes* are those of which we are consciously aware, and they are under the influence of controlled processing. *Implicit stereotypes* (also referred to as automatic stereotypes) operate on an unconscious level and are activated automatically when a member of a minority group is encountered in the right situation. The operation of implicit stereotypes was demonstrated in an interesting experiment conducted by Banaji et al. (1993). Participants first performed a “priming task,” which involved unscrambling sentences indicating either a male stereotype (aggressiveness), a female stereotype (dependence), or neutral sentences (neutral prime). Later, in a supposedly unrelated experiment, participants read a story depicting either a dependent (male or female) or an aggressive (male or female) target person. Participants then rated the target person in the story for the stereotypic or nonstereotypic trait.

The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 4.2. Notice that for both the male and female stereotypic traits, the trait was rated the same when the prime was neutral, regardless of the gender of the target. However, when the prime activated an implicit gender stereotype, the female stereotypic trait (dependence) was rated higher for female targets than for male targets. The opposite was true for the male stereotypic trait (aggressiveness). Here, aggressiveness



**FIGURE 4.2**

Results from an experiment on implicit stereotypes. When a prime activates an implicit female gender stereotype, a female stereotypic trait (dependence) was rated higher for female than for male targets. The opposite was true for the implicit male stereotypic trait (aggressiveness).


Based on data from Banaji et al. (1993).

was rated higher for male targets than for female targets. An incidental encounter with a stereotype (in this experiment, the prime) can affect evaluations of an individual who is a member of a given social category (e.g., male or female). Participants judged a stereotypic trait more extremely when the stereotype had been activated with a prime than when it had not. Thus, stereotyped information can influence how we judge members of a social group even if we are not consciously aware that it is happening (Banaji et al., 1993).

The activation of implicit stereotypes may have implications beyond believing that members of certain groups have given characteristics. In a study reported by Moskowitz et al. (2012), doctors associated certain diseases with a Black patient more readily than with a White patient, all on an implicit level. In this study, doctors were subliminally exposed to a face of either a White or Black person. Names of diseases or treatments were then presented “stereotypic”—associated with a particular racial group—or “nonstereotypic”. The speed with which a word could be identified as either a disease or treatment was recorded. Moskowitz et al. found that when subliminally primed by the face of a Black person, doctors identified stereotypically Black diseases faster than when primed by a White face. So, when doctors walk into an examination room to see a Black or White patient, they may be “primed” to automatically look for certain diseases. Furthermore, this effect is not isolated to artificial laboratory studies. In a review of the literature, FitzGerald and Hurst (2017) found evidence of implicit bias in the majority of the studies examining the issue. They noted that implicit bias was evident in the diagnosis, treatment, number of tests ordered, and questions asked of the patient.

Explicit and implicit stereotypes operate on two separate levels (controlled processing or automatic processing) and affect judgments differently, depending on the type of judgment a person is required to make (Dovidio et al., 1997). Dovidio and colleagues found that when a judgmental task required some cognitive effort (in this experiment, to determine whether a Black defendant was guilty or not guilty of a crime), explicit racial attitudes correlated with judgments. However, implicit racial attitudes were not correlated with the outcome on the guilt-judgment task. Conversely, on a task requiring a more spontaneous, automatic response (in this experiment, a word-completion task on which an ambiguous incomplete word could be completed in a couple of ways—e.g., b\_d could be completed as *bad* or *bed*), implicit attitudes correlated highly with outcome judgments. Thus, explicit and implicit racial attitudes relate to different tasks. Explicit attitudes related more closely to the guilt-innocence task, which required controlled processing. Implicit attitudes related more closely to the word-completion task, which was mediated by automatic processing.

Can implicit stereotypes translate into overt differences in *behavior* directed at Blacks and Whites? In one experiment, Correll et al. (2002) had college students play a simple video game. The task was for participants to shoot only armed suspects in the game. The race of the target varied between Black and White, some of whom were armed and some unarmed. The results of their first experiment, shown in Figure 4.3, showed that White participants shot at a Black armed target more quickly than a White armed target. They also decided NOT to shoot at an unarmed target more quickly if the target was White as compared to Black. Correll et al. also provided evidence that the observed “shooter bias” was more related to an individual adhering to cultural biases about Blacks as violent and dangerous rather than personally held prejudice or stereotypes. We should note that not all research shows such a bias against Black suspects. For example, a study by Lois James and her colleagues (2013) using a more realistic shooter paradigm task found just the opposite. James et al. used a realistic simulator and had participants use a laser pistol to shoot at suspects. They also included a sample of untrained civilians and trained police and military personnel. The main finding of interest was that White participants took *longer* to shoot Black suspects than White suspects and were more likely *not* to shoot armed Black suspects than armed White suspects. However, they were more likely to shoot unarmed White than Black suspects. Interestingly, the shooter effect also applies to other groups for which negative stereotypes exist. In one experiment, for example, participants were quicker to shoot a non-Black target dressed in Muslim garb (a turban or hijab) than a target not so dressed (Unkelbach et al., 2008). This was especially true when the “Muslim” target was depicted as a male (i.e., wearing a turban) rather than a female (i.e., wearing a hijab).



**FIGURE 4.3**

Reaction times to shoot armed or unarmed Black or White suspects.  
Based on data from Correll et al. (2002).


The automatic activation of stereotypes has been characterized as being a normal part of our cognitive toolboxes that improves the efficiency of our cognitive lives (Sherman, 2001). However, as we have seen, this increased efficiency isn't always a good thing. Can this predisposition toward automatic activation of stereotypes be countered? Fortunately, the answer is yes. Automatic stereotypes can be inhibited under a variety of conditions (Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005), including thinking of a counter-stereotypic image or if stereotype activation is perceived to threaten one's self-esteem. Sassenberg and Moskowitz suggest that it is possible to train a person to inhibit automatic activation of stereotypes on a general level so that a wide variety of automatic stereotypes can be inhibited, not just specific ones.

Sassenberg and Moskowitz (2005) investigated the impact of inducing participants to "think different" when it comes to members of minority groups. Thinking different means "one has a mindset in which one is avoiding the typical associations with those groups—one's stereotypes" (p. 507). In their first experiment, Sassenberg and Moskowitz had participants adopt one of two mindsets. The first mindset was a "creative mindset" in which participants were told to think of two or three times that they were creative. The second mindset was a "thoughtful mindset" in which participants were told to think of two or three times they behaved in a thoughtful way. After doing this, all participants completed a stereotype activation task. Sassenberg and Moskowitz found that stereotypes were inhibited when the "creative mindset" was activated, but not when the "thoughtful mindset" was activated. By encouraging participants to think creatively, the researchers were able to inhibit the activation of automatic stereotypes about African Americans. Sassenberg and Moskowitz suggest that encouraging people to "think differently" can help them inhibit a wide range of automatically activated stereotypes.

The "shooter bias" just discussed also can be modified with some work (Plant & Peruche, 2005). Plant and Peruche found that police officers showed the shooter bias during early trials with a computer game that presented armed or unarmed Black or White suspects. However, after a number of trials, the bias was reduced. The average number of errors of shooting at an unarmed suspect was different for Blacks and Whites during early trials, but not during late trials. During the early trials the officers were more likely to shoot at an unarmed Black suspect than an unarmed White suspect. During the later trials the rate of error was equivalent for the unarmed Black and White suspects.

Thus, training can attenuate the shooter bias; however, research suggests that the training must contain specific elements, or it can enhance shooter bias (Sim et al., 2013). Training





**FIGURE 4.4**

Racial bias in criterion to shoot as a function of participant sample.  
Based on data from Sim et al. (2013).

only reduces shooter bias when the race of the shooter is not a relevant diagnostic piece of information. In the Plant and Peruche (2005) study, when officers “played the game,” they saw an equal number of armed Whites and Blacks. Thus, race was not a factor that helped them decide to shoot or not to shoot. Because race was not diagnostic, the officers learned to ignore it, and their bias was reduced. But what if the training was manipulated so that race was related to whether the suspect was armed? Sim and colleagues (2013) found that when the training task reinforced the Black-dangerousness stereotype (i.e., where Black targets were disproportionately likely to be armed and White targets were disproportionately likely to be unarmed), the training did not eliminate the shooter bias but actually slightly increased the bias. In a subsequent study, Sim and colleagues (2013) found a similar pattern in the shooter paradigm with respect to “beat cops” and police officers who work in special gang units (see Figure 4.4). Beat cops work a particular neighborhood and encounter a diverse set of people. The one thing these people have in common is that they are usually not dangerous. Thus, a beat cop’s experiences on the job tend to be inconsistent with the Black-dangerousness stereotype. In contrast, the daily experiences of police officers who work in special gang units tend to reinforce the Black-dangerousness stereotype. That is, the gangs they are in contact with are often composed of minorities. Sims and colleagues found that bias on the shooter task was reduced for beat cops as compared to general community members. However, this reduction in bias was not present for police officers who work in special gang units.

Even when the training environment is inconsistent with the Black-dangerousness stereotype, there are still limiting conditions. As you have learned in previous chapters, we tend to process information in one of two ways: automatic and controlled processing. It appears that counter-stereotypical training reduces bias by altering the focus of our attention. We stop attending to race because it is not a diagnostic piece of information. However, this altering of our attention and information processing appears to require effort and cognitive resources. Thus, it is a controlled process. When people are put under a cognitive load (given another distracting task), the gains in bias reduction from training are lost (Singh et al., 2020). The bias reduction that results from training appears to be the result of resource-intensive, effortful processing, and when those cognitive resources are not available, people resort to relying on their stereotypes once again.

### Stereotype Accuracy and Malleability

Historically, social psychologists have characterized stereotypes as inaccurate and rigid (not easily changed). Is it, in fact, true that these two characterizations are true? In this section, we will explore this question. As a preview, let’s just say that there is

mounting evidence that these characterizations are not wholly accurate. It turns out that some aspects of stereotypes (but not all) are accurate. Also, stereotypes are malleable (can be changed) to some degree. We will start by reviewing the issue of stereotype accuracy.

The issue of stereotype accuracy has been addressed by Judd and Park (1993). They suggested several technical standards against which the accuracy of a stereotype can be measured. For example, consider the notion that Germans are efficient. One standard that Judd and Park suggested to measure the accuracy of that stereotype is to find data that answers the questions: Are Germans in reality more or less efficient than the stereotype? Is the group attribute (efficiency) exaggerated? Of course, to apply these standards, we need some objective data about groups. We need to know how groups truly behave with respect to various characteristics. For some attributes, say, kindness or sensitivity, it is probably impossible to obtain such information. For others, there may be readily available data.

Whether stereotypes are accurate or not depends on the definition for stereotypes that one adopts. According to Jussim et al. (2005), social psychologists have focused on the irrational and inaccurate nature of social stereotypes. Jussim et al. note that if one defines stereotypes in terms of inaccuracy, then we can only consider inaccurate beliefs about a group to be stereotypes. Jussim et al. favor a definition of a stereotype that is more “agnostic” and simply defines stereotypes in terms of the beliefs that comprise them. So, for example, we can empirically assess whether beliefs about groups match what is actually true of those groups. Therefore, we can assess the stereotype that women are worse at math than men by comparing women and men on the results of math assessments (e.g., the SAT). We can also test the belief that Jews are rich by comparing the relative wealth of Jews against that of other groups (Jussim et al., 2005).

Using the more “agnostic” and neutral definition of accuracy, research shows that many, but not all, beliefs about groups are accurate. For example, in one experiment Diekmann et al. (2001) asked students on a college campus about the political attitudes of men and women (e.g., abortion, health care, defense spending) and then compared those beliefs against the actual political attitudes of men and women. Diekmann et al. found a moderate degree of accuracy between the beliefs of the college students and the actual political attitudes of men and women. They also found that the college students were more accurate about the attitudes of women than men. In another study, assessments of women’s performance on 12 cognitive tasks matched actual performance on those tasks. Interestingly, participants had a tendency to underestimate performance (Halpern et al., 2011). This effect has also been found for ethnic differences. Ashton and Esses (1994) found that students made fairly accurate estimates of the academic performance (and relative rankings) of the academic performance of ethnic minorities in Canada. Coupled with a number of other areas in which beliefs about a group match actual characteristics reported by Jussim (Jussim, 2015; Jussim et al., 2005), it appears that beliefs relating to stereotypes are fairly accurate.

Is it important to know if a stereotype is accurate? Technically it is, because many of the earlier definitions of stereotypes assume that inaccuracy is part of the definition of the concept (Stangor & Lange, 1994). Most stereotypes are unjustified generalizations; that is, they are not accurate. But, even if they are accurate, stereotypes still have a damaging effect on our perception of others. None of us would wish to be judged as an individual by the worst examples of the group(s) to which we belong.

Now, let’s look at the malleability of stereotypes. There is considerable evidence, reviewed below, that overt forms of prejudice have decreased in recent years. Does this extend to stereotypes? Research in this area shows that stereotypes are malleable under certain conditions, and not all stereotypes are equally malleable. In one study, implicit and explicit stereotypes were compared before and after the 2008 presidential election. The results showed that although a change occurred in implicit stereotypes about Blacks after the election of Barack Obama, no significant change occurred in explicit stereotypes (Bernstein et al., 2010). Why was there no appreciable reduction in explicit stereotypes? Remember, explicit stereotypes are under conscious control. As such, individuals go through “mental gymnastics” to preserve consciously mediated beliefs. For example, a person could consider Obama an exception to the general stereotype of Blacks. Another strategy is to subtype the individual who deviates from an established stereotype (Richards & Hewstone, 2001). So, for Barack Obama, a person creates a subcategory of Blacks to include examples who show

counter-stereotypical traits. A person can also use subgrouping, which involves organizing groups of individuals according to their similarities and differences. Within a subgroup can be individuals who disconfirm and confirm social stereotypes (Richards & Hewstone, 2001). Interestingly, the strategy adopted (subtyping versus subgrouping) has a different effect on a stereotype. According to Richards and Hewstone, subtyping helps preserve the stereotype, and subgrouping caused differentiation of the stereotype. With subgrouping, the person is likely to end up with a more differentiated view of members of a stereotyped group, with the negative traits making up the stereotype being applied to fewer members of the group.

The idea that automatic stereotypes are malleable is confirmed in other studies. One study found that women exposed to counter-stereotypical models showed a reduction in automatically activated gender stereotypes of women (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004). Exposure to diversity information also reduces implicit (and explicit) stereotypes (Rudman et al., 2001). However, the effect of exposure to counter-stereotypical information or images has its limits. For example, exposing someone to a successful business woman leads to reductions in implicit stereotypes of women in a business context, but not in a domestic context (Hugenberg et al., 2010). The amount of implicit stereotype reduction also depends on culture and the type of intervention used to reduce the stereotype (Lenton et al., 2009). A meta-analysis by Lenton et al. shows that the impact of an intervention is larger in the United States than it is in Europe. They also found that stereotype reduction achieved using exposure to counter-stereotypic information is more effective than strategies encouraging individuals to suppress stereotypes.

### Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics

Another way that implicit stereotypes manifest themselves is by acting as *judgmental heuristics* (Bodenhauser & Wyer, 1985). For example, if a person commits a crime that is stereotype consistent (compared to one that is not stereotype consistent), observers assign a higher penalty, recall fewer facts about the case, and use stereotype-based information to make a judgment (Bodenhauser & Wyer, 1985). Generally, when a negative behavior is stereotype consistent, observers attribute the negative behavior to internal, stable characteristics. Consequently, the crime or behavior is seen as an enduring character flaw likely to lead to the behavior again.

This effect of using stereotype-consistent information to make judgments is especially likely to occur when we are faced with a difficult cognitive task. Recall from Chapter 3 that many of us are cognitive misers, and we look for the path of least resistance when using information to make a decision. When faced with a situation in which we have both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information about a person, more stereotype-consistent information than inconsistent information is likely to be recalled (Macrae et al., 1993). As Macrae and colleagues suggested, “when the information-processing gets tough, stereotypes (as heuristic structures) get going” (p. 79).

There are also individual differences in the extent to which stereotypes are formed and used. Levy et al. (1998) suggested that individuals use implicit theories to make judgments about others. That is, individuals use their past experience to form a theory about what members of other groups are like. According to Levy and colleagues, there are two types of implicit theories: *entity theories* and *incremental theories*. Entity theorists adhere to the idea that another person’s traits are fixed and will not vary according to the situation. Incremental theorists do not see traits as fixed. Rather, they see them as having the ability to change over time and situations (Levy et al., 1998). A central question addressed by Levy and colleagues was whether entity and incremental theorists would differ in their



Implicit but not explicit stereotypes of Blacks changed after Barack Obama's successful campaign in 2008.

Source: Steve Adamson/Shutterstock.



predisposition to form and use stereotypes. Based on the results of five experiments, Levy and colleagues concluded that compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists:

- Were more likely to use stereotypes.
- Were more likely to agree strongly with stereotypes.
- Were more likely to see stereotypes as representing inborn, inherent group differences.
- Tended to make more extreme judgments based on little information about the characteristics of members of a stereotyped group.
- Perceived a stereotyped group as having less intramember diversity.
- Were more likely to form stereotypes.

In addition to the cognitive functions of stereotypes, there is also an emotional component (Jussim et al., 1995). According to Jussim and colleagues, once you stereotype a person, you attach a label to that person that is used to evaluate and judge members of that person's group. Typically, a label attached to a stereotyped group is negative. This negative label generates negative affect and mediates judgments of members of the stereotyped group. Jussim and colleagues pointed out that this emotional component of a stereotype is more important in judging others than is the cognitive function (information storage and categorization) of the stereotype.

## Discrimination

**discrimination** Overt behavior—often negatively directed toward a particular group and often tied to prejudicial attitudes—which involves behaving in different ways toward members of different groups.

**Discrimination** is the behavioral component accompanying prejudice. Discrimination occurs when members of a particular group are subjected to behaviors that are different from the behaviors directed at other groups. For example, if members of a certain racial group are denied housing in a neighborhood open to other groups, that group is being discriminated against. Discrimination takes many forms. For example, it was not uncommon in the 19th through mid-20th centuries to see job advertisements that said “Irish need not apply” or “Jews need not apply.” It was also fairly common practice to restrict access to public places, such as beaches, for Jews and Blacks. And in the U.S. South, there were separate bathroom facilities, drinking fountains, and schools, and minorities were denied service at certain businesses. This separation of people based on racial, ethnic, religious, or gender groups is discrimination.

It is important to point out that discrimination often is a product of prejudice. Negative attitudes and assumptions about people based on their group affiliation have historically been at the root of prejudice. So, it is clear that many instances of discrimination can be traced directly to underlying prejudicial attitudes. However, discrimination can occur even in the absence of underlying prejudice. Consider the following example, based on Simpson's Paradox. Two departments in the same company offer to hire for new positions (Plous, 2016), with both receiving the same number of applicants. Suppose that Department 1 offers jobs to 10% of its applicants and Department 2 offers to 5%. Further, the two departments offer an equal number of jobs to White and Black candidates. At the department level, there is no discrimination in hiring. However, when the job offerings are combined and reported at the company level, discrimination appears to be occurring, even though there is no actual discrimination (see Plous, 2016, for a detailed explanation of this example). Additionally, just like prejudice and stereotyping, discrimination can be positive or negative. Most of the previous examples describe instances of negative discrimination (e.g., denying a person a job because of their race or ethnicity). However, there are times when we may give a person a job or some other benefit just because of their group membership. For example, an employer may give preference to an applicant because the applicant was in the same sorority as the employer in college. These positive forms of discrimination are often the result of positive prejudices that give us an overly optimistic view of a person.


## The Persistence and Recurrence of Prejudice and Stereotypes

Throughout history, members of *majority* groups (those in power) have held stereotypical images of members of *minority* groups (those not in power). These images supported

prejudicial feelings, discriminatory behavior, and even wide-scale violence directed against minority group members.

History teaches us that stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes are quite enduring. For example, some stereotypes of Jews and Africans are hundreds of years old. Prejudice appears to be an integral part of human existence. However, stereotypes and feelings may change, albeit slowly, as the context of our feelings toward other groups changes. For example, during and just after World War II, Americans had negative feelings toward the Japanese. For roughly the next 70 years, the two countries were at peace and had a harmonious relationship. This was rooted in the fact that the postwar American occupation of Japan (1945–1951) was benign. The Americans helped the Japanese rebuild their war-shattered factories, and the Japanese began to compete in world markets. But in the difficult economic times of the 1980s and early 1990s, many of the beliefs that characterized Japanese-American relations during World War II reemerged, although in somewhat modified form. Compared to how Japanese view Americans, Americans tend to see Japanese as more competitive, hardworking, prejudiced, and crafty (see Figure 4.5). Japanese have a slight tendency to see Americans as undereducated, lazy, and not terribly hard working. Americans see Japanese as unfair, arrogant, and overdisciplined, as grinds who do nothing but work hard because of their conformity to group values (Weisman, 1991). Japanese, for their part, see Americans as arrogant and lacking in racial purity, morality, and dedication (Weisman, 1991). The stereotypes on both sides have been altered and transformed by the passage of time, but like short skirts and wide ties, they tend to recycle. The periodicity of stereotypes suggests that they are based more on external factors such as economics and competition than on any stable characteristics of the group being categorized.

It is interesting to note that stereotypes and the cues used to categorize individuals change over time. Some historians of the ancient Mediterranean suggest that there was a time



**FIGURE 4.5**

How the Americans and Japanese view one another. Both Americans and Japanese hold stereotypical views of the other group.

Based on data from a 1992 Times/CNN poll, cited in Holland (1992).

before color prejudice. The initial encounter of Black Africans and White Mediterraneans is the oldest chapter in the chronicle of Black–White relations. Snowden (1983) traced the images of Africans as seen by Mediterraneans from the Egyptians to Roman mercenaries. Mediterraneans knew that these Black soldiers came from a powerful independent African state, Nubia, located in what today would be southern Egypt and northern Sudan. Nubians appear to have played an important role in the formation of Egyptian civilization (Wilford, 1992). Positive images of Africans appear in the artwork and writings of ancient Mediterranean peoples (Snowden, 1983)

The first encounters between Blacks and Whites were encounters between equals. The Africans were respected for their military skill and their political and cultural sophistication. Slavery existed in the ancient world but was not tied to skin color; anyone captured in war might be enslaved, whether White or Black (Snowden, 1983). Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination existed too. Athenians may not have cared about skin color, but they cared deeply about national origin. Foreigners were excluded from citizenship. Women were also restricted and excluded. Only males above a certain age could be citizens and participate fully in society.

It is not clear when color prejudice came into existence. It may have been with the advent of the African–New World slave trade in the 16th century. Whenever it began, it is likely that race and prejudice were not linked until some real power or status differences arose between groups. Although slavery in the ancient world was not based exclusively on skin color, slaves were almost always of a different ethnic group, national origin, religion, or political unit than their owners. In the next sections, we explore the causes of prejudice, focusing first on its roots in personality and social life and then on its roots in human cognitive functioning.

## Study Break

The previous sections defined three related processes: prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination. Before you begin the next section, answer the following questions:

1. What is the definition of prejudice, and why is it important to define it from a scientific perspective?
2. What is a stereotype, and what does one contain?
3. What is the difference between implicit and explicit stereotypes?
4. What is discrimination, and how does it relate to prejudice?

### authoritarianism

A personality characteristic that relates to a person's unquestioned acceptance of and respect for authority.

With an authoritarian personality, individuals are prejudiced against all groups perceived to be different from themselves. Members of hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan most likely have authoritarian personalities.

Source: Jon Rehg/Shutterstock.

## Individual Differences and Prejudice: Personality and Gender

What are the causes of prejudice? In addressing this question, social psychologists have looked not only at our mental apparatus, our inclination to categorize, but also at characteristics of the individual. Is there such a thing as a prejudiced personality? Are men or women

more prone to prejudice? We explore the answers to these questions in this section.

Social psychologists and sociologists have long suspected a relationship between personality characteristics and prejudice. One important personality dimension relating to prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination is **authoritarianism**. Authoritarianism is a personality characteristic that relates to unquestioned acceptance of and respect for authority. Authoritarian individuals tend to identify closely with those in authority and also tend to be prejudiced.

### The Authoritarian Personality

In the late 1940s, Adorno and other psychologists at the University of California at Berkeley studied





people who might have been the prototypes of Eric Cartman (a character on the popular TV show *South Park*)—individuals who wanted different ethnic groups to be suppressed and degraded, preferably by an all-powerful government or state. Eric Cartman embodies many of the characteristics of the **authoritarian personality**, which is characterized by submissive feelings toward authority; rigid, unchangeable beliefs; and racism and sexism (Adorno et al., 1950).

Motivated by the tragedy of the murder of millions of Jews and other Eastern Europeans by the Nazis, Adorno and his colleagues (1950) conducted a massive study of the relationship between the authoritarian personality and the Nazi policy of *genocide*, the killing of an entire race or group of people. They speculated that the individuals who carried out the policy of mass murder were of a personality type that predisposed them to do whatever an authority figure ordered, no matter how vicious or monstrous.

The massive study produced by the Berkeley researchers, known as *The Authoritarian Personality*, was driven by the notion that there was a relationship, and interconnectedness, between the way a person was reared and various prejudices he or she later came to hold. The study surmised that prejudiced people were highly *ethnocentric*; that is, they believed in the superiority of their own group or race (Dunbar, 1987). The Berkeley researchers argued that individuals who were ethnocentric were likely to be prejudiced against a whole range of ethnic, racial, and religious groups in their culture. They found this to be true, that such people were indeed prejudiced against many or all groups that were different from themselves. A person who was anti-color tended to be anti-Semitic as well. These people seemed to embody a prejudiced personality type, the authoritarian personality.

The Berkeley researchers discovered that authoritarians had a particularly rigid and punishing upbringing. They were raised in homes in which children were not allowed to express any feelings or opinions except those considered correct by their parents and other authority figures. People in authority were not to be questioned and, in fact, were to be idolized. Children handled pent-up feelings of hostility toward these suppressive parents by becoming a kind of island, warding these feelings off by inventing very strict categories and standards. They became impatient with uncertainty and ambiguity and came to prefer clear-cut and simple answers. Authoritarians had very firm categories: This was good; that was bad. Any groups that violated their notions of right and wrong were rejected.

This rigid upbringing engendered frustration and a strong concealed rage, which could be expressed only against those less powerful. These children learned that those in authority had the power to do as they wished. If the authoritarian obtained power over someone, the suppressed rage came out in full fury. Authoritarians were at the feet of those in power and at the throats of those less powerful. The suppressed rage was usually expressed against a *scapegoat*, a relatively powerless person or group, and tended to occur most often during times of frustration, such as during an economic slump.

There is also evidence that parental attitudes relate to a child's implicit and explicit prejudice (Sinclair et al., 2005). Sinclair et al. had parents of fifth and sixth graders complete a racial attitudes measure. The children completed measures of strength of identification with the parent and tests of implicit and explicit prejudice. The results showed that parental prejudice was significantly related to the child's implicit prejudice when the child's identification with the parent was high. So, it is children who have a strong desire to identify (take on the parent's characteristics) with the parent who are most likely to show implicit prejudice. A similar effect was found when the child's explicit prejudice was considered. When the child identified strongly with the parent, the parent's prejudice was positively associated with the child's explicit prejudice. This effect was the opposite for children who did not closely identify with the parents, perhaps indicating a rejection of parental prejudice among this latter group of children.

The authoritarian personality, the individual who is prejudiced against all groups perceived to be different, may gravitate toward hate groups. On July 2, 1999, Benjamin Smith went on a drive-by shooting rampage that killed two and injured several others. Smith took his own life while being chased by police. Smith had a history of prejudicial attitudes and acts. Smith came under the influence of the philosophy of Matt Hale, who became the leader of the World Church in 1996. Hale's philosophy was that the White race was

#### **authoritarian personality**

A personality dimension characterized by submissive feelings toward authority, rigid and unchangeable beliefs, and a tendency toward prejudicial attitudes.

the elite race in the world and that members of any other races or ethnic groups (which he called “inferior mud races”) were the enemy. Smith himself believed that Whites should take up arms against those inferior races. The early research on prejudice, then, emphasized the role of irrational emotions and thoughts that were part and parcel of the prejudiced personality. These irrational emotions, simmered in a pot of suppressed rage, were the stuff of prejudice, discrimination, and eventually, intergroup violence. The violence was usually set off by frustration, particularly when resources, such as jobs, were scarce.

### Political Orientation, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice

The search for personality correlates of prejudice has extended to investigations of whether one’s political ideology relates to prejudice. Altemeyer (1981) developed an updated version of the older authoritarianism scale, which measured *right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA). Although the scale was not intended to focus specifically on right-wing ideology and prejudice, research has found that political conservatives score higher on the RWA measure than liberals or moderates. RWA is characterized by a high degree of submission to legitimate authorities (authoritarian submission), aggressiveness directed against groups believed to be sanctioned by established authority (authoritarian aggression), and adherence to social conventions endorsed by society or authority figures (conventionalism) (Altemeyer, 1994). Generally, people high in RWA tend to be prejudiced against a wide variety of groups, including feminists (Duncan et al., 1997), lesbians and gay men (Whitley & Lee, 2000), Native Americans (Altemeyer, 1998), immigrants (Quinton et al., 1996), and overweight people (Crandall, 1994).

It is interesting to note that RWA appears to relate to the threat posed by groups (e.g., racial, sexual orientation) rather than the individuals making up those groups (Rios, 2013). Kimberly Rios did an interesting experiment in which participants could express prejudice against either “homosexuals” or against “gays and lesbians.” She found that high-RWA individuals expressed greater prejudice toward a person labeled as “homosexual” than when labeled as “gay and lesbian.” Low-RWA participants expressed lower levels of prejudice, regardless of the label used. Rios suggests that high-RWA individuals perceive homosexuals (but to a lesser extent, gays and lesbians) as a threat to their values as heterosexuals. She also suggests that the label “homosexual” is more likely than “gays and lesbians” to highlight differences between the social categories of homosexual and heterosexual. Both of these processes are involved in the effect she observed.

Attempts to establish a link between a left-wing, liberal political ideology and prejudice have met with mixed success. Initially, researchers attempted to measure left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996). It proved much more difficult to pin down exactly what characterized an LWA person and to establish a link with prejudice. However, research indicates that prejudice exists on the left wing of the political spectrum. For example, Yancy (2010) found that politically liberal participants expressed less warmth for religious fundamentalists than politically conservative participants. In another study, liberal participants made internal attributions for the misconduct of Marines and police accused of committing a crime; whereas conservative participants made external attributions. This is a reversal of the usual pattern of attributions made for wrongdoing where conservatives make internal attributions and liberals external attributions for wrongdoing of minority members. Generally, individuals on both ends of the political spectrum show the most positive feelings toward members of groups that align with their ideology (Brandt et al., 2014). Brandt et al. summarize this effect within their *ideological-conflict hypothesis*, which states that “conservatives and liberals will be similarly intolerant against social groups whose values and beliefs are inconsistent with their own” (p. 28). Brandt et al. report research findings in support of this hypothesis. For example, they report research results showing that compared to a liberal target, liberal students show a greater willingness to discriminate, more political intolerance, and less liking. The converse was true for conservative participants and a liberal target.

Other evidence indicates that prejudice and intolerance exist on the liberal end of the political spectrum as well as on the right end. LaVasseur (1997) developed a measure of LWA and investigated whether LWA related to how participants performed on a

simulated jury task. LaVasseur found that LWAs showed a bias in favor of a low-status defendant, recommending a less severe sentence than for a higher-status defendant. Chambers et al. (2012) had liberal and conservative participants evaluate targets that varied in race (Black or White) and political ideology (liberal or conservative). Chambers et al. found that participants of either political ideology rated Black targets equally positively. However, participant ideology was affected by targets' political ideology. Liberal participants rated liberal targets more favorably than conservative targets. The reverse was true for conservative participants. In another study in which participants completed a left-wing belief scale (LWB) and measures of warmth toward members of various groups (Jews, Chinese, Christians), participants with a liberal belief system showed prejudice against all three groups (Miller et al., 2012). Conway et al. (2018), using a methodology very similar to that of the previous study, also found a positive correlation between LWA and prejudice against religious minorities. Finally, Inbar and Lammers (2012) found that social psychologists (a primarily liberal group) expressed willingness to discriminate against conservative colleagues in hiring and paper review decisions. The more liberal the social psychologist, the more likely he or she was to discriminate.

Summing up. The research on political ideology and prejudice shows that prejudice exists on both ends of the political spectrum. Researchers have focused more on the right wing of the political spectrum, mainly because it is easier to identify individuals with RWA than to identify LWAs. However, a body of research shows that, although you have to look harder, there is bias and prejudice on the left wing of the political spectrum.

## Social Dominance Orientation

Another personality dimension that has been associated with prejudicial attitudes is **social dominance orientation (SDO)**. A social dominance orientation is defined as “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate or be superior to out-groups” (Pratto, Sidanius et al., 1994, p. 742). In other words, individuals with a high SDO would like to see their group (e.g., racial or ethnic group) be in a dominant position over other groups.

Research shows that one’s SDO correlates with prejudicial attitudes. For example, Pratto et al. (1994) found that a high SDO score was related to anti-Black and anti-Arab prejudice. The higher the SDO score, the more prejudice was manifested. In a later study SDO was found to correlate with a wide range of prejudices, including a generalized prejudice, and specific prejudices against individuals with a same-sex orientation and the mentally disabled. SDO was also found to correlate with racism and sexism (Ekehammar, Akrami et al., 2004). Additionally, SDO is negatively correlated with stereotype change (Tausch & Hewstone, 2010). Tausch and Hewstone found that high SDO individuals were less likely to modify a stereotype in the face of moderately counter-stereotypic information than were low SDO individuals.

In another experiment (Kemmelmeier, 2005), White mock jurors were asked to judge a criminal case in which the defendant was Black or White. The results showed no difference in how the White participants judged the Black or White defendant. However, participants who scored high on a measure of social dominance showed more bias against the Black defendant than participants who scored low on the social dominance measure. In fact, low SDO individuals showed a bias in favor of the Black defendant.

Interestingly, SDO is related to the perceived status differences between the groups (Levin, 2004). For example, Levin found that among American and Irish participants, individuals with high SDO scores saw a greater status difference between their group and an out-group (e.g., Irish Catholics versus Irish Protestants). In other words, an Irish Catholic person with a high SDO score saw a greater status difference between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants than an Irish Catholic with a lower SDO score. A similar, but nonsignificant, trend was found for Israeli participants.

If we consider the SDO dimension along with authoritarianism, we can identify a pattern identifying highly prejudiced individuals. In a study by Altemeyer (2004), participants completed measures of SDO and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Altemeyer found modest correlations between the SDO scale and RWA scale and prejudice when the scales were considered separately. However, when the two scales were considered

**social dominance orientation (SDO)** Desire to have one’s in-group in a position of dominance or superiority to out-groups. High social dominance orientation is correlated with higher levels of prejudice.



together (i.e., identifying individuals who were high on both SDO and RWA), stronger correlations were found with prejudice. Altemeyer concluded that individuals with both SDO and RWA are among the most prejudiced people you will find. Fortunately, Altemeyer points out, there are very few such individuals.

There is also evidence that SDO and RWA may relate differently to different forms of prejudice. Whitley (1999), for example, found that an SDO orientation was related to stereotyping, negative emotion, and negative attitudes directed toward African Americans and individuals with a same-sex orientation. However, RWA was related to negative stereotypes and emotion directed at individuals with a same-sex orientation, but not African Americans. In fact, RWA was related to positive emotions concerning African Americans.

## Openness to New Experience and Agreeableness

A popular model of personality is the “big five” model of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987). According to this approach, there are five dimensions underlying personality: extraversion/introversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience and culture. As we shall see, two of these dimensions (agreeableness and openness to experience) relate to prejudice. Briefly, agreeableness is a “friendliness dimension” including characteristics such as altruism, trust, and willingness to give support to others (Gerow & Bordens, 2015). Openness to experience includes curiosity, imagination, and creativity, along with a willingness to try new things and divergent thinking (Flynn, 2005).

Ekehammar and Akrami (2003) evaluated participants on the big five personality dimensions and measures of classic prejudice (overt, old-fashioned prejudice) and modern prejudice (prejudice expressed in subtle ways). Ekehammar and Akrami found that two of the big five personality dimensions correlated significantly with prejudice: agreeableness and openness to experience. Those participants high on the agreeableness and openness dimensions showed less prejudice. The remaining three dimensions did not correlate significantly with prejudice.


In another study, Flynn (2005) explored more fully the relationship between openness to experience and prejudice. The results of her three experiments confirmed that individuals who had high scores on openness to experience displayed less prejudice. For example, individuals who are open to new experiences rated a Black interviewee as more intelligent, responsible, and honest than individuals who are less open to new experiences.

## Other Personality Correlates of Prejudice

Social psychologists have also looked at whether there is a prejudiced personality (Dunbar, 1995; Gough, 1951). Gough developed a prejudiced scale (PR scale) using items from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Gough (1951) reported that the PR scale correlated with anti-Semitic attitudes among Midwestern high school students.

Dunbar (1995) administered the PR scale and two other measures of racism to White and Asian American students. He also administered a measure of anti-Semitism to see if the PR scale still correlated with prejudiced attitudes. Dunbar found that Asian Americans had higher scores on both the PR scale and the measure of anti-Semitism than did Whites, indicating greater anti-Semitism among Asians than Whites. However, the only significant relationships on the PR scale between anti-Semitic and racist attitudes were among the White participants.

Another personality factor that relates to prejudice is the *dark personality triad*, which comprises narcissism (excessive self-love), Machiavellianism (manipulating and exploiting others), and psychopathy (callous affect, interpersonal manipulation, erratic lifestyles, and antisocial behavior) (Hodson et al., 2009). Hodson et al. found that all three components of the triad were correlated with prejudice. Further, they found that the dark personality triad/prejudice relationship was mediated by two other factors: SDO and perception of intergroup threat (see Figure 4.6). Individuals exhibiting the dark triad also had SDO scores and tended to see out-groups as posing a threat. This, in turn, increased prejudice toward members of out-groups.



**FIGURE 4.6**

Illustration showing how SDO and intergroup threat mediate the relationship between the dark personality triad and prejudice.

Based on data from Hodson et al. (2009).

## Gender and Prejudice

Another characteristic relating to prejudice is gender. Research shows that men tend to be higher than women on SDO (Dambrun et al., 2004; Pratto et al., 1994). This gender difference appears to be rooted in different patterns of social identity orientations among men and women. Although men and women show in-group identification at equivalent levels (i.e., men identifying with the male in-group and women identifying with the female in-group), men more strongly identify with the male in-group than women with the female in-group (Dambrun et al., 2004).

Research on the relationship between gender and prejudice has concentrated on male and female attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Generally, males tend to have more negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians than women (Kite, 1984; Kite & Whitley, 1998). Do men and women view gay men and lesbians differently? There is evidence that males have more negative attitudes toward gay men than toward lesbians (Gentry, 1987; Kite, 1984; Kite & Whitley, 1998). The findings for females are less clear. Kite and Whitley, for example, reported that women tend not to make distinctions between gay men and lesbians. Other research, however, shows that females show more negative attitudes toward lesbians than gay men (Gentry, 1987; Kite, 1984). Interestingly, male (but not female) prejudice against homosexuals is mediated by SDO. Males with higher levels of SDO show more homophobia than males with lower levels (MacInnis & Hodson, 2015).

Baker and Fishbein (1998) investigated the development of gay and lesbian prejudice among a sample of seventh, ninth, and 11th graders. They found that males tended to be more prejudiced against gays and lesbians than females were, and male participants showed greater prejudice against gay males than against lesbians. Prejudice against gays and lesbians increased between seventh and ninth grade for both males and females; however, between the ninth and 11th grades, gay prejudice *decreased* for female participants, whereas it *increased* for male participants. Baker and Fishbein suggested that the increase in male antigay prejudice may be rooted in the male's increased defensive reactions to intimate relationships.

The same gender difference emerges when transphobia is assessed: Men show more transphobia than women (Tebbe & Moradi, 2012). Tebbe and Moradi report that although men and women differ in the level of transphobia, the same factors relate to prejudice for both genders (e.g., prejudice against gays and lesbians, SDO, and traditional gender roles). In another study, transphobia was positively correlated with RWA, religious fundamentalism, and hostile sexism (Nagoshi et al., 2008). Nagoshi et al. found that for men transphobia and homophobia were closely related. When homophobia was controlled for, the relationship between RWA, religious fundamentalism, and transphobia disappeared. For women, controlling for homophobia did not affect the relationship between RWA, religious fundamentalism, and transphobia.

A central question emerging from this research is whether there are gender differences in other forms of prejudice (racism, anti-Semitism, etc.).

Prejudice against gays and lesbians increased between seventh and ninth grade for both males and female.

Source: TheVisualsYouNeed/Shutterstock.



One study, for example, confirmed that males show more ethnic prejudice than females on measures concerning friendship and allowing an ethnic minority to live in one's neighborhood. Males and females did not differ when interethnic intimate relations were considered (Hoxter & Lester, 1994). There is relatively little research in this area, and clearly, more is needed to investigate the relationship between gender and prejudice for a wide range of prejudices.

### Study Break

One way to explain prejudice is to point to personality and other individual differences, such as gender. Before you begin the next section, answer the following questions:

1. What is the authoritarian personality, and how does it relate to prejudice?
2. How is social dominance orientation defined, and how does it relate to prejudice?
3. How do the big five personality dimensions and the dark personality triad relate to prejudice?
4. What is the relationship between gender and prejudice?

## The Social Roots of Prejudice

The research on personality and gender provides an important piece of the puzzle of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. However, it is only one piece. Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination are far too complex and prevalent to be explained by personality-based factors. Prejudice occurs in a social context, and another piece of the puzzle can be found in the evolution of feelings that form the basis of relations between dominant and other groups in a particular society.

To explore the social roots of prejudice, let's consider the situation of African Americans in the United States. During the years before the Civil War, Black slaves were considered the property of White slave owners, and this arrangement was justified by the notion that Blacks were in some way less human than Whites. Their degraded condition was used as proof of their inferiority.


In 1863, in the middle of the Civil War, President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, setting slaves free. But abolition did little to end prejudice and negative attitudes toward Blacks. The Massachusetts 54th Regiment, for example, was an all-Black Union Army unit—led by an all-White officer corps. Blacks were said to lack the ability to lead; thus no Black officers were allowed. Because of these stereotypes and prejudices, members of the 54th were also paid less than their White counterparts in other regiments. Initially also, they were not allowed in combat roles; they were used instead for manual labor, such as for building roads.

Despite prejudice, some Blacks did rise to positions of prominence. Frederick Douglass, who escaped from slavery and became a leader and spokesperson for African Americans, was instrumental in convincing President Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and to allow Black troops to fight in the Civil War. Toward the end of the war, over 100,000 Black troops were fighting for the North, and some historians maintain that without these troops, the result of the Civil War may have been different.

Over the course of the next hundred years, African Americans made strides in improving their economic and social status. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Brown v. Board of Education* that segregated (separate but equal) schools violated the Constitution and mandated that schools and other public facilities be integrated. Since then, the feelings

At one time the overt expression of prejudice was more acceptable than it is today. Social changes have made it unacceptable to express prejudices openly, but they still exist.

Source: Everette Historical/Shutterstock.






of White Americans toward African Americans have become more positive (Goleman, 1991). For example, between 1972 and 2008 fewer Whites reported a belief that Blacks are less intelligent or less hardworking than Whites. There was also a drop in endorsements of various forms of discrimination (Wihbey, 2014). This change in attitude and behavior reflects the importance of social norms in influencing and regulating the expression of feelings and beliefs.

Although definite improvements have been made in racial attitudes over the past decades, an undercurrent of negativity still exists. For example, a sizeable percentage (28%) of Whites in 2008 still endorsed the idea that a person should be able to discriminate based on race when selling his or her house (Wihbey, 2014). Additionally, a similarly sizeable percentage (36%) of White students oppose affirmative action on campus (compared to only 8% of Black and 15% of Hispanic students) (Pew Research Center, 2014). It may be that these still-negative views are related to the idea that Whites may pay lip service to the idea of equality. They perceive African Americans as being *both* disadvantaged by the system *and* deviant. In other words, White Americans are aware that African Americans may have gotten a raw deal, but they also see them as responsible for their own plight (Katz et al., 1986). Remember that the human tendency to attribute behavior to internal rather than external causes makes it more likely that people will ascribe the reasons for achievement or lack of it to the character of an individual or group.

A racial divide also still exists on a range of issues. According to a 2019 Pew Research Organization survey, Blacks and Whites differ in their perceptions of how fairly Blacks are treated. As shown in Figure 4.7, Blacks are more likely than Whites to say that Blacks are treated less fairly by the police, the criminal justice system, in hiring, when applying



**FIGURE 4.7**


Percentage of Blacks and Whites saying that Blacks are treated less fairly than Whites. Based on data from the Pew Research Organization (2019b).

for a loan, in stores or restaurants, when voting, and when seeking medical treatment. The divide was also shown in 2015 over the Confederate flag controversy. In this case, Blacks were more likely than Whites to say that it was right to take down the flag, that retailers should stop selling the flag, that it is fine for the government to ban the flag, and that the flag is a symbol of hate (Newseum Institute, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2015).

Given the importance of racial issues in U.S. history and given the way people process information in a categorical and automatic way, some observers assume that racist feelings are the rule for Americans (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

## Explicit and Implicit Prejudice

Although racist beliefs and prejudicial attitudes still exist, they have certainly become less prevalent than they once were. For example, according to data from the General Social Survey (1999), attitudes toward Blacks improved between 1972 and 1996. Figure 4.8 shows some of the data from this survey. As shown in Figure 4.8, responses reflecting more positive racial attitudes can be seen in questions concerning whether Whites have a right to keep Blacks out of their neighborhood (“Blacks out”), whether one would vote for a Black presidential candidate (“Black president”), whether Whites would send their children to a school where more than 50% of the children were Black (“Send children”), whether they would vote to change a rule excluding Blacks from a social club (“Change rule”), and whether they would support a law preventing housing discrimination (“Housing law”). These trends have maintained themselves or improved since 1996 (Moberg et al., 2019). For example, Moberg et al. reported that



**FIGURE 4.8**

The changing face of racial prejudice. Between the years 1972 and 1996, Whites have shown more favorable attitudes toward Blacks.

Based on data from General Social Survey (1999).

support for interracial marriage increased from around 45% in 1995 to over 80% by 2015. At the same time, opposition by Whites against laws preventing interracial marriages remained at just under 80% between 1995 and 2015. Despite these actual improvements, there is a general perception that race relations have gotten worse lately. A Gallup poll (2021c) tracking trends in race relations showed that among both Blacks and Whites, the percentage of people saying that race relations are somewhat or very good declined from the early 2000s to 2020. For example, in 2001, 70% of Blacks and 62% of Whites characterized race relations as very or somewhat good. This dropped to 36% of Blacks and 46% of Whites by 2020. These overt forms of racism that have been significantly reduced in the past decades represent *explicit prejudice*. Changes in laws, social norms, and greater sensitivity toward diversity issues have led to a significant reduction in expression of explicit prejudice. However, this does not mean that prejudice has gone away entirely.

Even though we are no longer as likely to express prejudice overtly and blatantly discriminate, prejudice still exists on a more subtle level. As we noted earlier stereotypes exist on both an explicit (overt, conscious) and implicit (unconscious, automatic) level. Prejudice also exists on both levels. *Implicit prejudice*, like implicit stereotypes, is under control of unconscious, automatic processes and is expressed in much more subtle ways than explicit prejudice. Although a person may claim to be nonprejudiced and would never discriminate, subtle signs of prejudice and discrimination may still be detected, when we look carefully for it.

One of the most prominent measures of implicit prejudice is the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). Greenwald and colleagues developed the IAT to solve a specific problem. The problem was that self-report explicit measures of prejudice were becoming less useful (as discussed previously). By the late 1990s, researchers had noticed that people seemed unwilling to express their prejudices because of the strong societal norms that had developed against such expressions. They wanted to develop a measure that could tap into people's attitudes that was immune to social desirability. The IAT was developed as such a measure. Hundreds of studies have been published using the IAT, most of which are concentrated on measuring implicit prejudice. The IAT measures how fast and accurately participants can categorize various stimuli. For example, in the standard race, IAT participants are asked to use the "e" and "i" keys on a keyboard to categorize faces and words across a series of trials. In the first series, participants are asked to identify White and Black faces that appear on the screen. In the second series, participants are asked to identify a series of words that flash on the screen that are unambiguously good or bad (i.e., *terrific* vs. *horrific*). Following the initial rounds, the categories are mixed. In these subsequent series, the participants must identify both faces and words using just the "e" and "i" key. Now the "e" key would be pressed when presented with either a Black face or a good word, and the "i" key would be pressed when presented with either a White face or a bad word. In a final series, these categories are reversed. Black faces are now paired with bad words and White faces are paired with good words. A person's level of implicit prejudice is based on how much easier it is for them to do the task (i.e., faster with fewer mistakes) when White faces are paired with good than when Black faces are paired with good.

Although there have been hundreds of published studies using the IAT, and it has even made its way into popular culture, appearing on an episode of *King of the Hill*, the IAT has come under attack. Particularly concerning to researchers are the psychometric properties and validity of the IAT. Schimmack (2021) demonstrated that only about 20% of the variance in the race IAT reflects racial preferences and that most of the differences in race IATs reflect measurement errors. Furthermore, meta-analytic reviews of the literature have revealed that the race IAT is a relatively weak predictor of behaviors and other types of prejudice measures (Greenwald et al., 2009; Kurdi et al., 2019; Oswald et al., 2013). This is particularly disheartening because the main reason the IAT was developed was because of the low predictive validity of traditional self-report measures. Meissner and colleagues (2019) have proposed various solutions that may help to address these issues, from restructuring the order of the trials in the IAT to changing how the scores are computed mathematically. The field of social psychology is in the middle of reexamining many of the implicit processes documented in the last 20 years, and the IAT is one of those. As you know from Chapter 1, this is how the process



**aversive racism** Racism involving a person who believes he or she is unprejudiced, but feels uneasy and uncomfortable in the presence of someone from a different racial group.


**modern racism** Subtle racial prejudice, expressed in a less open manner than is traditional overt racial prejudice and characterized by an uncertainty in feeling and action toward minorities.

of science works. It is self-correcting: As we learn more about a phenomenon, we revisit how we thought about it in the past and adjust our understanding.

Beyond the IAT, there have been other attempts to develop more subtle, unobtrusive measures of prejudice. One such measure of prejudice is known as **aversive racism**. Aversive racism involves people who truly believe they are unprejudiced, who want to do the right thing but, in fact, feel very uneasy and uncomfortable in the presence of someone from a different racial group (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). When they are with members of other groups, they smile too much, are overly friendly, and are sometimes very fearful. These feelings do not lead the aversive racist to behave in a negative way toward members of other groups; rather, they lead him or her to avoid them. Let's look at an example of how aversive racism can be manifested.

Imagine that you are a personnel manager who has to decide between two equally qualified job candidates, one of whom is Black and one White. Would you discriminate against the Black candidate? Most of us, thankfully, would say "no." What would happen, however, if people were given this choice without knowing that they were overtly choosing between a Black or White candidate? This is what was done by Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) in an imaginative experiment. Participants in this experiment were given a resume from a Black or a White job candidate who varied in the strength of his qualifications (strong, weak, or unclear). In this experiment, a participant judged only one job candidate (e.g., a White candidate with strong credentials) and did not choose between a White or Black candidate. Participants had to decide whether to recommend the job candidate for the job. The results of this experiment (combining results from two decades) are shown in Figure 4.9. As you can see, when the candidates had strong or weak qualifications, there was no significant difference between the Black and White candidates. A qualified candidate was recommended and an unqualified candidate rejected, regardless of race. If anything, the Black candidate was given a slight edge. However, when the qualifications were unclear, the White candidate was recommended significantly more often than the Black candidate. In this case, participants displayed an implicit prejudice against the Black candidate.

**Modern racism** is another form of subtle prejudice marked by an uncertainty in feeling and action toward people from different racial groups (McConahay, 1986). Modern racists moderate their responses to individuals from different racial groups to avoid showing



**FIGURE 4.9**

Percentage of participants recommending a job candidate based on race and strength of the candidate's qualifications.

Based on data from Dovidio and Gaertner (2000).

obvious prejudice; they express racism but in a less open manner than was formerly common. Modern racists would say that yes, racism is a bad thing and a thing of the past; still, it is a fact that African Americans “are pushing too hard, too fast, and into places where they are not wanted” (p. 93).

McConahay devised a scale to measure modern racism. In contrast to older scales, the modern racism scale presents items in a less racially charged manner. For example, an item from the modern racism scale might ask participants whether African Americans have received more economically than they deserve. On an old-fashioned scale, an item might ask how much you would mind if an African American family moved in next door to you. According to McConahay, modern racists would be more likely to be detected with the less racist items on an old-fashioned scale. McConahay found that the modern racism scale is sensitive enough to pick up more subtle differences in an individual’s racial feelings and behaviors than the older scales. The modern racism scale tends to reveal a more elusive and indirect form of racism than the older scales.

In one of McConahay’s experiments, participants (all of whom were White) were asked to play the role of a personnel director of a major company. All had taken a version of the modern racism scale. The “personnel director” received a resume of a graduating college senior who was a very ordinary job candidate. The race of the candidate was manipulated: for half of the participants, a photograph of an African American was attached, and for the other half, a photograph of a White person was attached.

Another variable was added to the experiment in addition to the race of the applicant. Half of each group of participants were told that there were no other qualified candidates for the job. This was called the *no anchor* condition, because the personnel directors had no basis for judgment, no other candidate against which to evaluate the ordinary candidate. The other half of each group saw the resumes of two other candidates, both White, who were far superior to the ordinary candidate, White or African American. This was called the *anchor* condition, because the personnel directors now had a basis for comparison.

Personnel directors in all four groups were asked to make a decision about the candidate on a scale ranging from “definitely would hire” to “definitely would not hire.” McConahay’s findings revealed that individuals who have high scores on the modern racism scale (indicating that they are prejudiced) do not treat White candidates any differently than their nonprejudiced counterparts.

Whether they scored 0 or 25 or somewhere in between on the scale, all participants rated the White candidates in both the anchor and the no-anchor condition in a similar way. Participants with low scores (near 0) rated White candidates about the same, whereas high scorers (closer to 25) rated the White no-anchor candidate a little higher than the White anchor candidate.

More interesting are the ratings of African American candidates. For nonprejudiced participants, African Americans, anchored or not, were rated precisely the same. But there was a very large difference between candidates for the prejudiced participants. An unanchored African American candidate was absolutely dismissed, whereas the anchored African American candidate, compared to more qualified Whites, was given the highest rating.

Why these differences? Recall that modern racists are rather uncertain about how to feel or act in situations with members of different racial or ethnic groups. They particularly do not want to discriminate when others will find out about it and can label what they did as racist (Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973). To reject a very ordinary African American candidate when there were no other candidates probably would not be seen as prejudiced, because the candidate was not qualified. Note how much more favorably the modern racist judged the White candidate in the same anchor circumstances.

But when there is a chance that his or her behavior might be termed racist, the modern racist overvalues African Americans. This is seen when there were qualified White candidates (anchor condition). The modern racist goes out of his or her way to appear unprejudiced and therefore gives the ordinary African American candidate the highest rating. Participants who scored low on the modern racism scale felt confident about how to feel and act in racial situations. People from different racial groups do not make them uncomfortable; they “call it like they see it” (Hass et al., 1991).

The concept of modern racism is not without its critics. Some suggest that it is illogical to equate opposition to an African American candidate or affirmative action programs with racism (Sykes, 1992). Other critics point out that modern racism researchers have not adequately defined and measured modern racism (Tetlock, 1986). They also point out that high correlations exist (ranging from about  $r = .6$  to  $.7$ ) between old-fashioned racism and modern racism. That is, if a person is a modern racist, he or she also is likely to be an old-fashioned racist. According to these critics, there simply may not be two forms of racism.

The fact is that race is a complex issue and contains many facets. In the past, according to public opinion surveys, Whites were essentially either favorable or unfavorable to the cause of African Americans. But racial feelings are more subtle now. Someone might be against busing of schoolchildren but not opposed to having an African American neighbor (Sniderman & Piazza, 1994). Additionally, a person's racial attitudes are often affected by his or her politics. Individuals who have favorable attitudes toward African Americans but who perceive affirmative action policies to be unfair may come to dislike African Americans as a consequence (Sniderman & Piazza, 1994).

### Changing Social Norms

What accounts for the changes we see in the expression of overt, explicit racist sentiments and for the appearance of modern racism? Our society, primarily through its laws, has made the obvious expression of racism undesirable. Over the past 30 years, social norms have increasingly dictated the acceptance of members of different racial and ethnic groups into mainstream society. Overt racism has become socially unacceptable. But for many individuals, deeply held racist sentiments remain unchanged. Their racism has been driven underground by society's expectations and standards.

Because of changed social norms, charges of prejudice and discrimination are taken seriously by those against whom they are made. In 2002, the Cracker Barrel restaurant chain was sued by the Justice Department on behalf of several patrons who claimed they had been discriminated against because of their race. In the lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that Cracker Barrel showed a pattern of discrimination against African Americans by refusing them

Changing social norms no longer allow overt discrimination against Blacks in restaurants. There was a time before the civil rights era when Blacks were not allowed to sit at "Whites Only" lunch counters.

Source: Everette Historical/Shutterstock.



service, allowing White waitstaffers not to serve Blacks, seating Black patrons in a segregated area, and making Black patrons wait longer than White patrons to be seated (NAACP, 2002). In 2004 Cracker Barrel settled the suit with the Justice Department. Cracker Barrel agreed to overhaul its manager and employee training (Litchblau, 2004).

Despite such cases, hate messages still proliferate on the internet. It is nearly impossible to get an accurate count of the number of hate sites on the internet. Various researchers have studied how hate groups such as Neo-Nazis, Skinheads, and the Ku Klux Klan are using the internet to spread their message of hate (Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Chau & Xu, 2007; Douglas et al., 2005; McNamee et al., 2010). The internet has allowed hate speech and the advocacy of violence against minorities to cross national boundaries. For example, on one Web site, one can peruse a variety of racist cartoons and purchase hate-related products. Hate-based “educational materials” are also easily obtained on the internet. One program called *The Jew Rats* portrays Jews as rats who are indoctrinated to hate others and take over the world. Racist video games are also readily available. One game called *Bloodbath in Niggeria* involves shooting caricatures of Africans who pop up in huts. Yet another called *Border Patrol* allows gamers to shoot illegal Mexican immigrants running across the U.S. border. In addition, the internet provides a medium that can help hate groups organize more easily. In addition to organizing on a local level, hate sites can now easily link hate groups across land and ocean, making the spread of hate and prejudice much easier.

There is evidence that attitudes, although not necessarily behavior, toward specific groups have become more positive. As noted previously, a drop has occurred in the past decades in the belief by Whites that Blacks lack intelligence and motivation for hard work. In this case, social norms in favor of greater equality seem to be holding. Finally, it is worth noting that social norms operate on a number of levels simultaneously. It is generally true that societal norms have turned against the overt expression of prejudice, and this has reduced prejudice. However, norms also operate on a more “local” level. We not only are affected by societal norms but are also influenced by the norms of those closest to us (e.g., family and friends). If it is normative within your immediate group of family and friends not to be prejudiced or express prejudices, then odds are you won’t. If, however, your immediate family and friends are prejudiced and express prejudices, then you will probably do the same. This effect was shown in an experiment in which pro-gay rights and anti-gay rights participants participated in a group discussion with others who did not agree with them (actually confederates of the researchers). The results showed that anti-gay rights participants showed more hesitancy to express their views than pro-gay rights participants (Walker et al., 2015). In a social context in which the expression of prejudice is not allowed, we are less likely to express it than if in a context where it is accepted (Zitek & Hebl, 2007). Generally, we strive to be “good group” members, which often means following the norms established by that group, whether positive or negative (Crandall et al., 2002).

### Study Break

Social psychologists have investigated how social factors relate to prejudice, stereotype, and discrimination. Before you go on to the next section, answer the following questions:

1. How have social norms relating to prejudice and discrimination changed over the past decades, and how have those changes changed the expression of prejudice?
2. What are implicit and explicit prejudice, and how do they relate to behavior?
3. What are modern and aversive racism, and how do they relate to behavior?
4. How do social norms affect the expression of prejudice?

## The Cognitive Roots of Prejudice: From Categories to Stereotypes

Cognitive social psychologists believe that one of the best ways to understand how stereotypes form and persist is to look at how humans process information. As we saw in




Chapters 2 and 3, human beings tend to be cognitive misers, preferring the least effortful means of processing social information (Taylor, 1981). We have a limited capacity to deal with social information and therefore can deal with only relatively small amounts at any one time (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

Given these limitations, people try to simplify problems by using shortcuts, primarily involving category-based processes (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Brewer, 1988). In other words, it is easier to pay attention to the group to which someone belongs than to the individual traits of the person. It takes less effort and less time for someone to use category-based (group-based) information than to try to deal with people on an individual basis (Macrae et al., 1994). Research studies of the cognitive miser demonstrate that when people's ability or motivation to process information is diminished, they tend to fall back on available stereotypes. For example, in one study, when a juror's task was complex, he or she recalled more negative things about a defendant if the defendant was Hispanic than if the defendant did not belong to an identifiable group. When the juror's task was simple, no differences in judgment were found between a Hispanic and a non-Hispanic defendant (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). When the situation gets more complicated, individuals tend to rely on these stereotypes.

Individuals are more likely to fall back on stereotypes when they are not at the peak of their cognitive abilities (Bodenhausen, 1990; Zhang & Peng, 2020). Bodenhausen tested participants to determine if they were "night people"—individuals who function better in the evening and at night—or "day people"—individuals who function better in the morning. He then had participants make judgments about a student's misconduct. Sometimes the student was described in nonstereotypic terms (his name was "Robert Garner"), and in other situations he was portrayed as Hispanic ("Roberto Garcia"), as African American, or as an athlete.

The experiment showed that when people are not at their peak (morning people at night or night people in the morning), they tend to solve problems by using stereotypes. As shown in Figure 4.10, morning types relied on the stereotype to judge the student



**FIGURE 4.10**

Ratings of perceived guilt as a function of time of day, personality type, and stereotype activation. When individuals are not at their cognitive peak, they are more likely to rely on stereotypes when making judgments.

Based on data from Bodenhausen (1990).

when presented with the case in the evening; evening types fell back on stereotypes in the morning. These findings suggest that category-based judgments take place when we do not have the capacity, the motivation, or the energy to pay attention to the target, and these lead human beings into a variety of cognitive misconceptions and errors.

## Identification with the In-Group

One of the principal cognitive processes common to all human beings seems to be the tendency to categorize people either as belonging to an *in-group* (us) or an *out-group* (them) (Allport, 1954). This tendency has implications beyond simple categorization. We tend to identify with and prefer members of the in-group. We also tend to ascribe more uniquely “human emotions” (e.g., affection, admiration, and pride) to the in-group than the out-group (Leyens et al., 2000). Taken together, these tendencies comprise the **in-group bias**. This tendency to favor the in-group is accompanied by a simultaneous tendency to identify “different” others as belonging to a less favored out-group, which we do not favor.

**in-group bias** The powerful tendency of humans to favor in-group members over out-group members.

Our tendency to favor the in-group and vilify the out-group is related to the type of emotions we experience about those groups. When we feel good about something that the in-group does or is associated with and feel anger over what the out-group does, then we are most likely to strongly identify with the in-group (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). So, for example, if our country is associated with something good (e.g., winning an Olympic medal) and another country is associated with something bad (e.g., a judging scandal at the Olympics), we feel the most in-group pride and are likely to strongly identify with the in-group. Conversely, we are less likely to identify with the in-group when it is associated with something bad and the out-group is associated with something good (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). In other words, we are likely to bask in reflected glory (BIRG) when the in-group does something good and cut off reflected failure (CORF) when the in-group does something bad (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). This might explain why so many people change attitudes quickly (e.g., about the 2003 Iraq War) when news is bad (CORFing). However, when things are going well (e.g., the early stages of the Iraq War), we experience a sense of national pride and are happy with our BIRGing.

How we perceive and judge members of an out-group depends, at least in part, on how we perceive the in-group. The in-group is normally used as a standard by which the behavior of out-group members is judged (Gawronski et al., 2005). In fact, a contrast effect occurs when in-group and out-group members are compared on the same traits. For example, if members of an in-group perceive that their group possesses a trait, they are likely to perceive that out-group members do not (Gawronski et al., 2005). In short, the way we perceive our own group (the in-group) has a lot to do with how we perceive the out-group.

Henri Tajfel, a social psychologist, studied the phenomenon of in-group favoritism as a way of exploring out-group hostility. He was preoccupied with the issue of genocide, the systematic killing of an entire national or ethnic group. As a survivor of Nazi genocide of European Jews from 1939 to 1945, Tajfel had a personal as well as a professional interest in this issue (Brown, 1986).

Unlike earlier researchers, who emphasized the irrational thoughts and emotions of the prejudiced personality as the source of intergroup violence, Tajfel believed that cognitive processes were involved. He believed that the process of categorizing people into different groups led to loyalty to the in-group, which includes those people one perceives to be similar to oneself in meaningful ways. Inevitably, as in-group solidarity forms, those who are perceived to be different are identified as members of the out-group (Allport, 1954; Billig, 1992).

Tajfel was searching for the minimal social conditions needed for prejudice to emerge. In his experiments with British schoolboys, he found that there was no situation so minimal that some form of in-group solidarity did not take shape. He concluded that the need to favor the in-group was a basic component of human nature. What are the reasons for this powerful bias?

As noted in Chapter 2, we derive important aspects of our self-concepts from our membership in groups (Turner, 1987). These memberships help us establish a sense of positive

social identity. Think of what appears to be a fairly inconsequential case of group membership: being a fan of a sports team. When your team wins a big game, you experience a boost, however temporary, to your sense of well-being (by BIRGing). You don't just root for the team; you become part of the team. You say, "We beat the heck out of them." Think for a moment about the celebrations that have taken place in Detroit, New York, Boston, and elsewhere after home teams won professional sports championships. It is almost as if it wasn't the Tigers or the Mets or the Celtics who won, but the fans themselves.

When your team loses the big game, on the other hand, you feel terrible. You're tempted to jump ship. It is hard to read the newspapers or listen to sportscasts the next day. When your team wins, you say, "We won." When your team loses, you say, "They lost" (Cialdini et al., 1975). It appears that both BIRGing and jumping ship serve to protect the individual fan's self-esteem. The team becomes part of the person's identity.

### Social Identity Theory

#### social identity theory (SIT)

An assumption that we all need to have a positive self-concept, part of which is conferred on us through identification with certain groups.

Tajfel's (1982) **social identity theory (SIT)** assumes that human beings are motivated to positively evaluate their own groups and value them over other groups, in order to maintain and enhance self-esteem. The group confers on the individual a social identity, that part of a person's self-concept that comes from her membership in social groups and from her emotional connection with those groups (Tajfel, 1981).

Fundamental to social identity theory is the notion of categorizing the other groups, pigeonholing them, by the use of stereotypes—those general beliefs that most people have about members of particular social groups (Turner, 1987). People are motivated to hold negative stereotypes of out-groups; by doing so, they can maintain the superiority of their own group and thereby maintain their positive social (and self) identity.

Generally, any threat to the in-group, whether economic, military, or social, tends to heighten in-group bias. Additionally, anything that makes a person's membership in a group more salient, more noticeable, will increase in-group favoritism. One series of experiments showed that when people were alone, they were likely to judge an out-group member on an individual basis, but when they were made aware of their in-group membership by the presence of other members of their group, they were likely to judge the out-group person solely on the basis of stereotypes of the out-group (Wilder & Shapiro, 1984, 1991). The increase of in-group feelings promoted judgments of other people on the basis of social stereotypes. When group membership gets switched on, as it does, for example, when you are watching the Olympics or voting for a political candidate, then group values and social stereotypes play a larger role in how you react.

Finally, getting people to engage in group-affirmation (focusing on characteristics of one's group) leads to greater attribution of negative traits to an out-group than if you get people to engage in self-affirmation, especially if the in-group is an important one to the person (Ehrlich & Gramzow, 2015).

### Self-Categorization Theory

#### self-categorization theory (SCT)

A theory suggesting that people need to reduce uncertainty about whether their perceptions of the world are "correct" and seek affirmation of their beliefs from fellow group members.

Increase in self-esteem as a result of group membership is central to SIT (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). To increase members' self-esteem, the in-group needs to show that it is distinct from other groups in positive ways (Mummenday & Wenzel, 1999). Central to an extension of SIT, **self-categorization theory (SCT)** is the notion that self-categorization is also motivated by the need to reduce uncertainty (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). The basic idea is that people need to feel that their perceptions of the world are correct, and this correctness is defined by people—fellow group members—who are similar to oneself in important ways. In a study by Haslam et al. (1999), when the category Australian was made salient for a group of Australian students, it tended to reduce uncertainty about the characteristics that comprise one's social group. Consequently, it regulated and structured the members' social cognition. This is consistent with SCT. When reminded of their common category or group membership, the Australian students were more likely to agree on what it meant to be Australian.

What are the consequences of uncertainty? Grieve and Hogg (1999) showed that when uncertainty is high (i.e., when group members did not know if their performance was adequate

or would be successful in achieving group goals), groups were more likely to downgrade or discriminate against other groups. In other words, uncertainty is a threat. Uncertainty was also accompanied by increased group identification. So threat creates a kind of rally-round-the-flag mentality. Self-categorization theory suggests, then, that only when the world is uncertain does self-categorization lead to discrimination against other groups (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). Self-categorization theory adds a bit of optimism to its parent theory's (SIT) outlook by suggesting that categorization does not always lead to discrimination, and if threat can be managed or alleviated, little discrimination or intergroup antagonism need occur.

## A Biological Perspective on the In-Group Bias

Tajfel's research has shown us that the formation of an in-group bias serves basic social and self needs primarily by maintaining personal self-esteem. Some scientists, specifically sociobiologists—scientists who take a biological approach to social behavior—believe that ethnocentrism (the increased valuation of the in-group and the devaluation of out-groups) has a foundation in human biological evolution. They point out that for the longest part of their history, humans lived in small groups ranging from 40 to 100 members (Flohr, 1987). People had to rely on the in-group and gain acceptance by its members; it was the only way to survive. It would make sense, then, that a strong group orientation would be part of our human heritage: Those who lacked this orientation would not have survived to pass their traits on to us.

Sociobiologists also point out that people in all cultures seem to show a naturally occurring *xenophobia*, or fear of strangers. This fear may also be part of our genetic heritage. Because early populations were isolated from one another (Irwin, 1987), people may have used similar physical appearance as a marker of blood relationship (Tonnesmann, 1987). Clearly, there was always the possibility that people who looked different could be a threat to the food supply or other necessities of survival. Sociobiologists argue that it is reasonable to expect that people would be willing to cooperate only with humans of similar appearance and biological heritage and that they would distrust strangers (Barkow, 1980).

In modern times, as Tajfel showed, we still derive much of our identity from group membership; we fear being excluded from groups (Baumeister & Tice, 1990). High respect for our own groups often means a devaluing of other groups. This is not necessarily a big problem until groups have to compete for resources. Because the world does not appear to offer a surplus of resources, competition among groups is inevitable. Of particular interest to sociobiologists is a study by Tajfel (1982) and his coworkers in which it was demonstrated that children show a preference for their own national group long before they have a concept of country or nation. Children ranging in age from 6 to 12 years old were shown photographs of young men and were asked how much they liked those men. Two weeks later, the children were shown the same photographs again. They were also told that some of the men belonged to their nation and others did not. The children had to decide which young men were “theirs” (belonged to their country) and which were not. The researchers found that the children were more likely to assign the photographs they liked to their own nation. Therefore, liking and in-group feelings go together at an age when children cannot really comprehend fully the idea of a nation (Flohr, 1987).

In sum, those who offer a biological perspective on intergroup prejudice say that strong in-group identification can be understood as an evolutionary survival mechanism. We can find examples throughout human history of particular ethnic, racial, and religious groups that have strengthened in-group bonds in response to threats from the dominant group (Eitzen, 1973; Myrdal, 1962). Strengthening of these in-group bonds may help the group survive, but this is only one way of looking at the in-group bias. Acceptance of this notion does not require us to neglect our social psychological theories; it simply gives us some idea of the complexity of the issue (Flohr, 1987).

## The Role of Language in Maintaining Bias

Categorization is, generally, an automatic process. It is the first step in the impression formation process. As mentioned earlier, it is not the same as stereotyping and prejudice, but it powerfully affects these other processes. One way in which categorizing can lead to prejudice is through language. The way we sculpt our world via the words and labels we use to




describe people connects the category to prejudice. Social psychologist Charles Perdue and his colleagues tested the hypothesis that the use of words describing in-groups and out-groups unconsciously forms our biases and stereotypes (Perdue et al., 1990).

Perdue suggested that the use of collective pronouns—*we, us, ours, they, their, theirs*—is very influential in how we think about people and groups. We use these terms to assign people to in-groups and out-groups. In one study, Perdue and his colleagues showed participants a series of nonsense syllables (*xeh, yof, laj*) paired with pronouns designating in-group or out-group status (*we, they*). Participants were then asked to rate each of the nonsense syllables they had just seen in terms of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the feelings they evoked. As shown in Figure 4.11, nonsense words paired with in-group pronouns were rated much more favorably than the same nonsense words paired with out-group pronouns or with control stimuli. Out-group pronouns gave negative meaning to previously unencountered and neutral nonsense syllables.

In a second experiment, these investigators demonstrated that in-group and out-group pronouns bias the processing of information about those groups. Participants saw a series of positive- and negative-trait words, such as *helpful, clever, competent, irresponsible, sloppy, and irritable*. Now, a positive trait ought to be positive under any circumstances, and the same should hold true for negative traits, wouldn't you agree? *Skillful* is generally positive; *sloppy* is generally negative. But as Figure 4.12 shows, it took participants longer to describe a negative trait as negative when that trait had been associated with an in-group pronoun. Similarly, it took participants longer to describe a positive trait as positive when it had been associated with an out-group pronoun. It took them little time to respond to a positive trait associated with an in-group pronoun and to a negative trait associated with an out-group pronoun.


These findings suggest that we have a nonconscious tendency (after all, the participants were not aware of the associations) to connect in-group labels with positive attributes rather than negative ones and out-group labels with negative attributes rather than positive ones. These associations are so strong that they shape the way we process subsequent information. They also seem to be deep and long lasting, a fact that may help explain why stereotypes remain so tenacious.



**FIGURE 4.11**

Standardized ratings of target syllables as a function of pronoun pairing. Syllables paired with in-group pronouns were judged more pleasant than those paired with outgroup pronouns.

Based on Perdue et al. (1990).



**FIGURE 4.12**

Reaction times to positive and negative trait descriptors as a function of pronoun type (in-group or out-group). Information processing is affected by in-group and out-group thinking. Based on Perdue et al. (1990).

## System Justification and Prejudice

Social identity theory and self-categorization theory both take the same basic approach to explaining the roots of prejudice. They both assume that a major factor underlying prejudice is the dynamic that develops between in-group solidarity and attitudes toward out-groups. Jost et al. (2004) refer to these approaches as *group justification theories*. Traditionally, social psychologists have emphasized group justification theories when trying to explain stereotyping and prejudice. Jost et al. point out that there is another way to explain stereotyping and prejudice that does not rely on group justification. The alternative approach is known as **system justification theory**. According to system justification theory, prejudice can occur when members of groups justify the existence of social arrangements at the expense of interpersonal and group interests.

From a system justification perspective, stereotyping and prejudice relate to the motivation to maintain existing social order and relationships among groups. Because this motive exists for both members of groups in power (majority groups) and stigmatized groups (minority groups), existing negative stereotypes and prejudices maintain themselves. This tendency to maintain intergroup relations is demonstrated by the fact that oftentimes members of marginalized groups endorse the negative stereotypes about their groups to an even greater extent than do members of the majority group (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). By endorsing own-group negative stereotypes, the status quo of intergroup perceptions and relations is maintained. Stronger motivations toward system justification are associated with more “stereotypic differentiation” between groups (Jost et al., 2005). Jost et al. (2005) also found that the relationship between system justification beliefs



If a doctor believes that a patient is likely to have a certain disease based on race, the doctor might misdiagnose the patient due to an illusory correlation.

Source: Rocketclips, Inc./Shutterstock.

### **system justification theory**

A theory stating that prejudice can occur when members of groups justify the existence of social arrangements at the expense of interpersonal and group interests.

and stereotyping was found to cut across different cultural groups. Finally, we should note that these system justification processes are stronger on the implicit than explicit level (Essien et al., 2020; Jost et al., 2004).

## Illusory Correlations

### illusory correlation

An error in judgment about the relationship between two variables in which two unrelated events are believed to covary.

The tendency to associate negative traits with out-groups is explained by one of the fundamental cognitive bases of stereotyping, the illusory correlation. An **illusory correlation** is an error in judgment about the relationship between two variables or, in other words, a belief that two unrelated events covary (are systematically related) (Hamilton & Sherman, 1989). For example, a person may notice that each time he wears his old high school bowling shirt when he goes bowling, he bowls very well. He may come to believe that there is a connection between the two events. Similarly, if you think that members of a minority group are more likely than members of a majority group to have a negative trait, then you perceive a correlation between group membership and behavior relating to that trait (Schaller, 1991).

Sometimes this cognitive bias crops up even among trained professionals. For example, a physician diagnosed a young, married African American woman with chronic pelvic inflammatory disease, an ailment related to a previous history of sexually transmitted disease. This diagnosis was made despite the fact that there was no indication in her medical history that she had ever had such a disease. As it turned out, she actually had endometriosis, a condition unrelated to sexually transmitted diseases (*Time*, June 1, 1992). The physician's beliefs about young Black women, that they are sexually promiscuous, led to a diagnosis consistent with those beliefs. Research supports this anecdote. For example, participants have been found to ascribe different abilities to a girl depending on whether she is portrayed as having a lower or higher socioeconomic-status background (Darley & Gross, 1983).

These examples illustrate the human tendency to overestimate the co-occurrence of pairs of distinctive stimuli (Sherman et al., 1989). In the case of the misdiagnosis, the presence of two distinctive stimuli—a young Black woman and a particular symptom pattern—led the physician to conclude that the woman's disorder was related to her sexual history. The tendency to fall prey to this illusion has been verified in other experiments (Chapman & Chapman, 1967).

The illusory correlation helps explain how stereotypes form. The reasoning goes like this: Minority groups are distinctive because they are encountered relatively infrequently. Negative behavior is also distinctive because it is, in general, encountered less frequently than positive behavior. Because both are distinctive, there is a tendency for people to overestimate the frequency with which they occur together, that is, the frequency with which minority group members do undesirable things (Sherman et al., 1989).

Research shows that if people are presented with information about a majority group and a minority group and these groups are paired with either rare or common traits, people associate the smaller group with the rarer trait (Hamilton & Sherman, 1989). If both a minority and majority group have the same negative trait, say a tendency toward criminal behavior, the negative behavior will be more distinctive when paired with the minority as compared to the majority group. Our cognitive apparatus seems to lead us to make an automatic association between negative behavior and minority group membership.

How many encounters with a minority group member are required for an illusory correlation to form? Common sense would suggest that such correlations would only form after many encounters with minority group members. However, this is not the case. It turns out that an illusory correlation can form after only one encounter with a minority group member (Risen et al., 2007). To demonstrate this, Risen et al. had participants watch a video in which a South Asian or Caucasian student behaved in a “pushy” manner. Next, participants had to form an impression of either a different South Asian or Caucasian person by completing incomplete words. These words could be completed to indicate either pushiness or not (e.g., D \_ \_ \_ nd can be completed as “demand” or “depend”). Finally, participants had to select a

group of questions to ask either a South Asian or Caucasian in an online interview (some of the questions dealt with pushiness and some did not). Risen et al. found that participants exposed to the pushy South Asian in the video were more like to complete the words in a pushy direction and select more pushy questions than participants exposed to the pushy Caucasian. Participants had formed a “one-shot” illusory correlation after the single exposure to the pushy South Asian student in the video.

Distinctive characteristics are also likely to play a critical role in the formation of category-based responses. In any gathering of people, we pay more attention to those who appear to be different from others, such as a White in an otherwise all-Black group, or a man in an all-woman group. Skin color, gender, and ethnicity are salient characteristics.

One function of automatic evaluation is to point to events that may endanger the perceiver (Pratto & John, 1991). Certainly, sociobiologists would agree with that notion. The human ability to recognize friend from foe, safety from danger, would have fundamental survival value (Ike, 1987). For example, people automatically responded to an angry (salient) face in a happy crowd (Hansen & Hansen, 1988). An angry person among friends is dangerous. Another study demonstrated that individuals automatically turn their attention from a task to words, pictures, or events that might be threatening (Pratte & John, 1991).

Participants attended more rapidly to salient negative traits than to positive ones. This automatic vigilance may lead people to weigh undesirable attributes in those around them differently than positive attributes.

When we encounter other groups, then, it is not surprising that we pay more attention to the bad things about them than the good. Negative social information grabs our attention. This greater attention to negative information may protect us from immediate harm, but it also helps perpetuate stereotypes and may contribute to conflict between groups (Pratto & John, 1991).

### **From Illusory Correlations to Negative Stereotypes via the Fundamental Attribution Error**

The fact that a negative bit of information about a different group has grabbed our attention does not necessarily lead to discrimination against that group. There must be a link between the salience of negative information and prejudiced behavior. The fundamental attribution error—the tendency to overestimate internal attributes and underestimate the effect of the situation—supplies this link and plays a role in the formation of discriminatory stereotypes. This is particularly true when perceivers do not take into account the roles assigned to people. Recall the quiz show study described in Chapter 3 in which participants thought that the quiz show questioners were smarter than the contestants (Ross et al., 1977), even though roles had been randomly assigned.

This confusion between internal dispositions and external roles has led to punishing negative stereotypes of different groups. Let’s consider just one example, the experience of the Jews in Europe over the past several hundred years (Ross & Nisbitt, 1991). Historically, Jews had many restrictions imposed on them in the countries where they resided. They were prevented from owning land; they often had to be in certain designated areas; they could not enter politics; and many professions were closed to them.

This exclusion from the greater society left the Jews with two options: either convert to Christianity or maintain their own distinctive culture. Most Jews opted for the latter, living within the walls of the ghetto (in fact, the word *ghetto* is derived from the Venetian word *Gheto*, which referred to a section of the city where iron slag was cooled and Jews were forced to live) assigned to them by the Christian majority and having little to do with non-Jews. Exclusion and persecution strengthened their in-group ties and also led the majority to perceive them as clannish. However, one segment of the Jewish population was highly visible to the mainstream society—the money lenders. Money lending was a profession forbidden to Christians and open to Jews (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Although



it was held in contempt, it was an essential function in national and international business, especially as capitalism began to develop. Jewish money lenders became important behind-the-scenes figures in the affairs of Europe. Thus, the most distinctive members of the group—distinctive for their visibility, their economic success, and their political importance—were invariably money lenders.

The distinctive negative role of money lending, although restricted to only a few Jews, began to be correlated with Jews in general. Jews were also seen as distinctive because of their minority status, their way of life, their unique dress, and their in-group solidarity. All of these characteristics were a function of the situation and roles thrust on the Jews by the majority, but they came to be seen, via the fundamental attribution error, as inherent traits of Jewish people in general. These traits were then used as a justification for discrimination, based on the rationale that Jews were different, clannish, and money grubbing.

Jews have been depicted in negative ways throughout history. For example, in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, the Jewish money lender, Shylock, is depicted as a bloodthirsty person who will stop at nothing to extract his pound of flesh for repayment of a defaulted debt. However, do these stereotypes still crop up today in "enlightened" American communities? Movie director Steven Spielberg grew up in New Jersey and Arizona but never experienced anti-Semitism until his family moved to Saratoga, California, during his senior year in high school:

He encountered kids who would cough the word *Jew* in their hands when they passed him, beat him up, and throw pennies at him in study hall. "It was my six months of personal horror. And to this day I haven't gotten over it nor have I forgiven any of them." (*Newsweek*, December 20, 1993, p. 115)

Jews were not the only group to suffer from majority exclusion and the fundamental attribution error (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). The Armenians in Turkey, the Indians in Uganda, and the Vietnamese boat people were all money middlemen who took on that role because no other positions were open to them. All of these groups suffered terrible fates.

## The Confirmation Bias

As you learned in Chapter 3, the *confirmation bias* is the tendency to look for evidence that confirms already existing beliefs. It also involves interpreting new information as confirming preexisting beliefs. People dealing with Jews in the 18th century in Europe or with Armenians in Turkey at the turn of the 20th century found it easy to confirm their expectancies about these groups; perceivers could recall the money lenders, the strange dress, and the different customs. Stereotypes are both self-confirming and resistant to change.

Numerous studies show that stereotypes can influence social interactions in ways that lead to their confirmation. In one study, some participants were told that a person with whom they would soon talk was in psychotherapy; other participants were told nothing about the person (Sibicky & Dovidio, 1986). In actuality, the individuals they talked to were randomly chosen students from basic psychology courses; none were in therapy. After the interviews, participants were asked to evaluate the person with whom they had interacted. Those individuals identified as therapy clients were rated less confident, less attractive, and less likable than the individuals not described as being in therapy.

We can see from this study that once people have a stereotype, they evaluate information within the context of that stereotype. After all, none of the people being interviewed in the experiment was in fact in therapy. The differences between the ratings had to be due to the participants' stereotypical view of what somebody in therapy must be like. Describing a person as being in therapy seems to lead to a negative perception of that person. People who hold negative stereotypes about certain groups may behave so that group members act in a way that confirms the stereotype (Crocker & Major, 1989). The confirmation bias contributes in many instances to self-fulfilling prophecies. If you expect a person to be hostile, your very expectation and the

manner in which you behave may bring on that hostility. In the study just described, participants who thought they were interacting with someone in therapy probably held a stereotypical view of all people with psychological problems. It is likely that they behaved in a way that made those individuals uneasy and caused them to act in a less confident manner.

## The Out-Group Homogeneity Bias

An initial effect of categorization is that members of the category are thought to be more similar to each other than is the case when people are viewed as individuals. Because we have a fair amount of information about the members of our own group (the in-group), we are able to differentiate among them. But we tend to view members of other groups (out-groups) as being very similar to one another (Wilder, 1986). This phenomenon of perceiving members of the out-group as all alike is called the **out-group homogeneity bias** (Linville et al., 1989).

The out-group homogeneity hypothesis was tested in one study involving students from Princeton and Rutgers Universities (Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Participants, who were either Rutgers or Princeton students, saw a videotape of a student supposedly from the other school. The videotaped person had to decide whether he wanted to wait alone or with other people before being a participant in a psychological experiment. The actual participant then had to predict what the average student at the target university (Rutgers for Princeton students and Princeton for Rutgers students) would do in a similar situation.

Would the participants see students at the other university as similar to the student they had viewed? Would they predict that most Princeton students (or Rutgers students) would make the same choice as the Princeton student (or Rutgers student) in the film clip? These questions get at the issue of whether people see out-group members as more similar to one another than to the in-group members. In fact, this is pretty much what the study showed, although there was a greater tendency to stereotype Princeton students than Rutgers students. That seems logical, because it is probably easier to conjure up a stereotype of Princeton student. In general, however, results supported the notion that the out-group homogeneity bias leads us to think that members of out-groups are more similar to one another than to members of in-groups.

A second outcome of out-group homogeneity bias is the assumption that any behavior of an out-group member reflects the characteristics of all group members. If a member of an out-group does something bad, we tend to conclude, “That’s the way those people are.” In contrast, when an in-group member does something equally negative, we tend to make a dispositional attribution, blaming the person rather than our own in-group for the negative behavior. This has been referred to as the **ultimate attribution error**: We are more likely to give in-group members the benefit of the doubt than out-group members (Pettigrew, 1979).

Once we construct our categories, we tend to hold on to them tenaciously, which may be both innocent and destructive. It is innocent because the process is likely to be automatic and nonconscious. It is destructive because stereotypes are inaccurate and often damaging; individuals cannot be adequately described by reference to the groups to which they belong.

In previous chapters, we have seen how automatic and controlled processing enter into the social cognition process. Some people use controlled processing to readjust initial impressions of others in instances where new information conflicts with existing categorization (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Trope, 1986). Automatic and controlled processing again come into play when we consider how stereotypes are maintained and how prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals differ.

## The Difference Between Prejudiced and Nonprejudiced Individuals

Devine (1989) contends that stereotypes are automatically activated when we encounter a member of a particular social group. According to Devine, some people are able

### **out-group homogeneity bias**

The predisposition to see members of an out-group as having similar characteristics or being all alike.

### **ultimate attribution error**

The tendency to give in-group, but not out-group, members the benefit of the doubt for negative behaviors.

to consciously alter their prejudiced responses, whereas others are not. Devine found that those interested in being nonprejudiced think differently from those who are not. For example, prejudiced individuals are more willing to indulge in negative thoughts and behaviors toward members of different racial and ethnic groups than nonprejudiced individuals. Devine also found that both high- and low-prejudiced Whites hold almost the same stereotypes of African Americans. However, nonprejudiced individuals think those stereotypes are wrong.

Devine also found that the main difference between prejudiced and nonprejudiced Whites was that nonprejudiced Whites are sensitive to and carefully monitor their stereotypes. The nonprejudiced person wants his or her behavior to be consistent with his or her true beliefs rather than his or her stereotypes. When given a chance to use controlled processing, nonprejudiced individuals show behavior that is more consistent with nonprejudiced true beliefs than stereotyped beliefs. In contrast, the behavior of prejudiced individuals is more likely to be guided by stereotypes. In another study, nonprejudiced individuals were more likely than prejudiced individuals to feel bad when they had thoughts about gay men and lesbians that ran counter to their beliefs (Monteith et al., 1993). When nonprejudiced individuals express prejudicial thoughts and feelings, they feel guilty about doing so (Devine et al., 1991).

What happens if automatic processing takes over? According to Devine, activating a stereotype puts a person into automatic mode when confronting a person from the stereotyped group. The automatically activated stereotype will be acted on by both prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals unless there is an opportunity to use controlled processing (Devine, 1989). Devine found that when participants in an experiment were prevented from switching to controlled processing, both prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals evaluated the behavior of an African American negatively.

We can draw several conclusions from Devine's research. First, prejudiced individuals are less inhibited about expressing their prejudice than nonprejudiced individuals. Second, no differences exist between prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals when stereotype activation is beyond conscious control. Third, nonprejudiced people work hard to inhibit the expression of negative stereotypes when they have the opportunity to monitor behavior and bring stereotypes under conscious control. Fourth, nonprejudiced individuals realize that there is a gap between their stereotypes and their general beliefs about equality, and they work continually to change their stereotyped thinking.

How easy is it to identify a prejudiced person? If you see a person in a Ku Klux Klan outfit distributing hate propaganda or burning a cross on someone's lawn, that's pretty easy. However, many people do not express prejudices in such obvious ways. When we encounter someone who makes racist or sexist comments, we can pretty easily identify that person as prejudiced (Mae & Carlston, 2005). Further, we will express dislike for that person, even if he or she is expressing ideas with which we agree (Mae & Carlston, 2005). So, it seems we are pretty adept at identifying individuals who express negative prejudices. However, when it comes to detecting positive prejudices, we are less adept. Speakers who espouse negative prejudices are more likely to be identified as prejudiced than those who espouse positive prejudices (Mae & Carlston, 2005).

### Study Break

A third way that social psychologists explain prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination is through cognitive factors. Specifically, our tendency to define the world in terms of in-groups (us) and out-groups (them) contributes to prejudice. Before you begin the next section, answer the following questions:

1. What are in-groups and out-groups, and how do they relate to prejudice?
2. What are social-identity theory and self-categorization theory, and why are they important in understanding prejudice?

3. How do illusory correlations and the confirmation bias help maintain prejudice?
  4. What is the out-group homogeneity bias, and how does it relate to prejudice?
  5. How do prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals differ?
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## The Consequences of Being a Target of Prejudice

Imagine being awakened several times each night by a telephone caller who inundates you with racial or religious slurs. Imagine being a second-generation Japanese American soldier on December 8, 1941 (the day after the Pearl Harbor attack), and being told you are no longer trusted to carry a gun in defense of your country. Imagine being an acknowledged war hero who is denied the Medal of Honor because of race-related suspicions of your loyalty to the country for which you had just fought. In each of these instances, a person becomes the target of prejudicial attitudes, stereotypes, and discriminatory behavior directed at him or her. What effect does being the target of such prejudice have on an individual? To be sure, being a target of discrimination generates a great deal of negative affect and has serious emotional consequences for the target (Dion & Earn, 1975). Next, we explore some of the effects that prejudice has on those who are its targets.

## Ways Prejudice Can Be Expressed

In his monumental work on prejudice called *The Nature of Prejudice*, Gordon Allport (1954) suggested that there are five ways that prejudice can be expressed. These are *antilocution*, talking in terms of prejudice or making jokes about an out-group; *avoidance*, avoiding contact with members of an out-group; *discrimination*, actively doing something to deny members of an out-group something they desire; *physical attack*, beatings, lynchings, and the like; and *extermination*, an attempt to eliminate an entire group. One issue we must address is the reaction shown by members of an out-group when they are targeted with prejudice. It is fairly obvious that those faced with overt discrimination, physical attack, and extermination will respond negatively. But what about reactions to more subtle forms of prejudice? What toll do they take on a member of a minority group?

Swim et al. (1998) characterized some forms of prejudice as *everyday prejudice*: “recurrent and familiar events that can be considered commonplace” (p. 37). These include short-term interactions such as remarks and stares, and incidents that can be directed at an individual or an entire group. According to Swim and colleagues, such incidents can be initiated either by strangers or by those with intimate relationships with the target and have a cumulative effect and contribute to the target’s experience with and knowledge of prejudice.

## Prejudice-Based Jokes

How do encounters with everyday prejudice affect the target? Let’s start by looking at one form of antilocution discussed by Allport that most people see as harmless: prejudice-based jokes. Most of us have heard (and laughed at) jokes that make members of a group the butt of the joke. Many of us may have even told such jokes, assuming that they do no harm. But how do those on the receiving end feel? Women, for example, find sexist jokes less funny and less amusing than nonsexist jokes (LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998). They also tend to report feeling more disgusted, angry, hostile, and surprised by sexist versus nonsexist jokes. They also tend to roll their eyes (indicating disgust) and touch their faces (indicating embarrassment) more in response to sexist than to nonsexist jokes (LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998).

Ryan and Kanjorski (1998) directly compared the reactions of men and women to sexist jokes. They found that compared to men, women enjoyed sexist humor less and found it less acceptable and more offensive. Interestingly, men and women did not differ in terms of telling sexist jokes. A more ominous finding was that for men, there were





One form of prejudicial antilocution is prejudice-based jokes. Although they may be funny, they have a negative effect on individuals from the targeted group.


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significant positive correlations between enjoyment of sexist humor and rape myth acceptance, adversarial sexual beliefs, acceptance of interpersonal violence, likelihood of engaging in forced sex, and sexual aggression. In another study, the exposure of men with sexist attitudes to sexist jokes was related to tolerance for sexism and fewer negative feelings about behaving in a sexist manner (Ford et al. 2001). These findings may lend some credence to Allport’s (1954) idea that antilocution, once accepted, sets the stage for more serious expressions of prejudice.

A study reported by Thomas and Esses (2004) confirms the relationship between sexist attitudes and enjoyment of sexist humor. Male participants completed measures of sexism and authoritarianism. They then evaluated two types of sexist jokes. Half of the jokes were degrading to women and

half degrading to men. The results showed that male participants who scored highly on the sexism scale found the jokes degrading females funnier and were more likely to repeat them than male participants who were low on the sexism measure. Sexism did not relate to the evaluation of the jokes that degraded men.

The relationship between sexist attitudes and enjoyment of sexist humor is complicated by the fact that sexism takes a variety of forms. Sexism has two main components: hostile and benevolent (Greenwood & Isbell, 2002). *Hostile sexism* consists of hostile attitudes toward women such as beliefs that women manipulate men to gain power and are too easily offended (Greenwood & Isbell, 2002). *Benevolent sexism* consists of positive attitudes toward women such as women are more pure than men and women should be put on a pedestal (Greenwood & Isbell, 2002). Based on these two components, sexism can be classified as hostile (high on hostile and low on benevolent sexism), ambivalent (high on hostile and benevolent sexism), nonsexist (low on both hostile and benevolent sexism), and benevolent (low on hostile and high on benevolent sexism) (Greenwood & Isbell, 2002). As shown in Figure 4.13, Greenwood and



**FIGURE 4.13**  
Average rating of amusement of dumb blonde jokes by different types of male and female sexists. Based on data from Greenwood and Isbell (2001).

Isbell found that men and women who were hostile and ambivalent sexists enjoyed dumb blonde sexist jokes (no significant difference was found between hostile and ambivalent male and female sexists). For nonsexist males and females, females were slightly more likely to enjoy sexist humor than males (the difference here was marginally significant). Finally, there was a clear difference between male and female benevolent sexists: male benevolent sexists enjoyed the dumb blonde jokes more than female benevolent sexists. Greenwood and Isbell found a very similar pattern was found for the degree to which males and females found the jokes offensive.

## Stereotype Threat

Many stereotypes exist about a wide range of groups. Women are not supposed to do as well as men in math, Blacks are not supposed to do as well as Whites academically, older people are supposed to be worse drivers than younger people, and Asians are supposed to do better than others academically. What impact can such stereotypes have on a person who is required to do a task that relates to a stereotype about that person's group? Will a person react to that stereotype with poor performance? The answer to this question is yes. For example, if an elderly person does a simulated driving task after being told that a study focuses on why elderly drivers are bad drivers (activating a stereotype), they do more poorly on the simulated driving task than if they are not told what the study is about (Joannis et al., 2013).

The effect of activating a stereotype about one's group has been extensively studied in the area of racial stereotypes. For example, one intriguing hypothesis about why Blacks might not score well on standard tests of IQ comes from an experiment conducted by Steele and Aronson (1995). According to Steele and Aronson, when a person is asked to perform a task for which there is a negative stereotype attached to their group, that person will perform poorly because the task is threatening. They called this idea a **stereotype threat**. To test this hypothesis, Steele and Aronson conducted the following experiment. Black and White participants took a test comprising items from the verbal section of the Graduate Record Exam. One-third of the participants were told that the test was diagnostic of their intellectual ability (diagnostic condition). One-third were told that the test was a laboratory tool for studying problem solving (nondiagnostic condition). The final third were told that the test was of problem solving and would present a challenge to the participants (nondiagnostic—challenge condition). Steele and Aronson then determined the average number of items answered correctly within each group.

The results of this experiment showed that when the test was said to be diagnostic of one's intellectual abilities, Black and White participants differed significantly, with Black participants performing more poorly than White participants. However, when the *same* test was presented as nondiagnostic, Black and White participants did equally well. There was no significant difference between Blacks and Whites in the nondiagnostic-challenge condition. Overall across the three conditions, Blacks performed most poorly in the diagnostic condition. In a second experiment, Steele and Aronson (1995) produced results that were even more pronounced than in their first. They also found that Black participants in the diagnostic condition finished fewer items and worked more slowly than Black participants in the nondiagnostic condition. Steele and Aronson pointed out that this is a pattern consistent with impairments caused by test anxiety, evaluation apprehension, and competitive pressure.

In a final experiment, Steele and Aronson (1995) had participants perform word-completion tasks (e.g., — — ce; la — —; or — — ack) that could be completed in a racially stereotyped way (e.g., race; lazy; Black) or a nonstereotyped way (e.g., pace; lace; track). This was done to test if stereotypes are activated when participants were told that a test was either diagnostic or nondiagnostic. Steele and Aronson found that there was greater stereotype activation among Blacks in the diagnostic condition compared to the nondiagnostic condition. They also found that in the diagnostic condition, Blacks were more likely than Whites to engage in self-handicapping strategies (i.e., developing behavior patterns that actually interfere with performance,

### stereotype threat

The condition that exists when a person is asked to perform a task for which there is a negative stereotype attached to their group and performs poorly because the task is threatening.

such as losing sleep the night before a test). Blacks and Whites did not differ on self-handicapping behaviors in the nondiagnostic condition.


These findings help us understand why Blacks consistently perform more poorly than Whites on intelligence tests. Intelligence tests by their very nature and purpose are diagnostic of one's intellectual abilities. According to Steele and Aronson's (1995) analysis, when a Black person is faced with the prospect of taking a test that is diagnostic of intellectual ability, it activates the common stereotype threat that Blacks are not supposed to perform well on tests of intellectual ability. According to Steele and Aronson, the stereotype threat impairs performance by generating evaluative pressures. Recall that participants who were under stereotype threat in the diagnostic condition spent more time doing fewer items. As they became more frustrated, performance was impaired. It may also impair future performance, because more self-handicapping strategies are used by Blacks facing diagnostic tests. In short, the stereotype threat creates an impairment in the ability to cognitively process information adequately, which in turn inhibits performance. So, lower scores on IQ tests by Blacks may relate more to the activation of the stereotype threat than to any genetic differences between Blacks and Whites.

Steele and his colleagues extended the notion of the stereotype threat to other groups. For example, Spencer et al. (cited in Aronson et al. 1998) found that men and women equated for math ability performed differently on a math test, depending on whether they were told that there were past results showing no gender differences in performance on the test (alleviating the stereotype threat) or given no information about gender differences (allowing the stereotype threat to be activated). Specifically, when the "no gender differences" information was given, men and women performed equally well on the test. However, when the stereotype threat was allowed to be activated (i.e., that women perform more poorly on math tests than do men), men scored significantly higher than women. Aronson and Alaines reported similar effects for Latino versus White participants and White males versus Asian males (cited in Aronson et al., 1998).

In a more direct test of the relationship between gender, stereotype threat, and math performance, Brown and Josephs (1999) told male and female students that they would be taking a math test. One-half of the participants of each gender were told that the test would identify exceptionally strong math abilities, whereas the other half were told that the test would uncover especially weak math skills. Brown and Josephs reasoned that for males the test for strong math skills would be more threatening, because it plays into the stereotype that males are strong in math. On the other hand, the test for weakness would be more threatening to females, because females stereotypically are viewed as being weak in math. Their results were consistent with Steele and Aronson's stereotype threat notion. Males performed poorly on the test that supposedly measured exceptional math skills. Conversely, females performed poorly on the test that was said to identify weak math skills. In both cases, a stereotype was activated that was relevant to gender, which inhibited performance. According to Brown and Josephs, the stereotype threat for math performance is experienced differently for males and females. Males feel more threatened when faced with having to prove themselves worthy of the label of being strong in math skills, whereas females feel more threatened when they face a situation that may prove a stereotype to be true.

Stereotype threat also operates by reducing positive expectations a person has going into a situation. For example, based on a person's previous experience, he or she may feel confident about doing well on the SATs, having a positive expectation about his or her performance on the exam. Now, let's say that a stereotype of this person's group is activated prior to taking the exam. The resulting stereotype threat may lower that person's expectations about the test, and as a consequence, the person does not do well.

The fact that this scenario can happen was verified in an experiment by Stangor, Carr, and Kiang (1998). Female participants in this experiment all performed an initial task of identifying words. Afterward, some participants were told that their performance on the task provided clear evidence that they had an aptitude for college-level work. Other participants were told that the evidence concerning college performance was unclear.



**FIGURE 4.14**

Task performance as a function of feedback about prior performance and activation of a stereotype threat. When no threat was activated, participants used performance on a prior task to form expectations about further performance. When a threat was activated, performance was affected by what was expected based on the stereotype.

Based on Stangor et al. (1998).

Next, participants were told that there was either strong evidence that men did better than women on the second test (stereotype threat) or that there were no sex differences (no stereotype threat). Before working on the second task, participants were asked to rate their ability to perform the second task successfully. The results of this experiment, shown in Figure 4.14, were clear. When a stereotype threat was not activated, performance was affected by the feedback given after the first task. Those participants who believed that there was clear, positive evidence of college aptitude had higher expectations of success than those given unclear feedback. In the stereotype threat condition, the two groups did not differ in their expectations concerning the second task.

Thus, in addition to arousing anxiety about testing situations, stereotype threats also lower one's expectations about one's performance. Once these negative expectations develop, a self-fulfilling prophecy is most likely developed that "Because I am a female, I am not expected to do well on this task." Poor performance then confirms that prophecy.

Whether the arousal related to a stereotype threat adversely affects performance depends, in part, on the nature of the task individuals must perform. A consistent finding in social psychology is that arousal enhances performance on a simple task but inhibits performance on a more difficult task (we discuss this effect in detail in Chapter 8). Ben Zeev et al. (2005) conducted a study to investigate this effect. Participants performed either a simple task (writing their names in cursive several times) or difficult task (writing their names in cursive backwards) under stereotype threat or no threat. Ben Zeev et al. found that the arousal associated with the stereotype threat enhanced performance on the simple task and inhibited performance on the difficult task.

In a second experiment Ben Zeev et al. found that how participants attributed the cause for their arousal affected performance. Once again, participants were exposed to either a stereotype threat condition or no-threat condition. Participants were told that one purpose of the study was to investigate performance while being exposed to subliminal noise. Participants in the misattribution condition were told that the subliminal noise would produce physical



symptoms such as arousal and nervousness. Participants in the control group were told that the subliminal noise would have no physical side effects. All participants completed a moderately difficult math test while being exposed to the noise. The results showed that participants in the control group showed the usual stereotype threat effect (poorer performance under threat versus no threat). However, in the misattribution condition there was no significant threat effect on performance. Hence, if you can attribute your arousal to something other than a stereotype, you will perform well. Arousal related to stereotype threat appears to be an important mediator of performance, as is how the source of the arousal is attributed.

Although arousal appears to be an important mediator of stereotype threat, it is not the only mediator. Over the last 20 years, researchers have identified over a dozen mediators of stereotype threat. Stereotype threat has been shown to impair performance by increasing anxiety (Chung et al., 2010), decreasing the capacity of working memory (Schmader & Johns, 2003), and inducing intrusive negative thoughts (Cadinu et al., 2005), and these are just a few examples. There appears to be no single mechanism by which stereotype threat produces its effects on performance. Rather, it appears that stereotype threat may be mediated by different mechanisms depending on who is experiencing the threat and in what context the threat is experienced (Pennington et al., 2016).

Finally, it is not just minorities who experience stereotype threat. For example, White men experienced stereotype threat and had lowered mathematical performance when they believed their performance would be compared with that of Asian men (Aronson et al., 1995). Additionally, White men also have altered performance on motor tasks when the tasks are related to “natural athletic ability” and their performance will be compared to that of Black men (Stone et al., 1999). Thus, stereotype threat is possible anytime a negative stereotype becomes self-relevant, even when the group is generally not stigmatized (e.g., White men).

## Collective Threat

The preceding studies show how being the target of a stereotype can affect individual behavior in a very specific context (i.e., testing). Stereotypes can also have a broader, more general effect by making members of stereotyped groups sensitive to the stigmatizing effects of the stereotype. In other words, a person from a stereotyped group may become overly concerned that a transgression by a member of one’s group may reflect badly on him or her as an individual (Cohen & Garcia, 2005). Cohen and Garcia refer to this as **collective threat**. Collective threat flows from “the awareness that the poor performance of a single individual in one’s group may be viewed through the lens of a stereotype and may be generalized into a negative judgment of one’s group” (Cohen & Garcia, 2005, p. 566).

Cohen and Garcia conducted a series of studies to assess the effects of collective threat. In their first study junior and senior high school students completed a questionnaire that included measures of collective threat (concern that behavior of other members of one’s group will reflect badly on the group as a whole), stereotype threat (concern that one’s own behavior will reflect badly on one’s group), and a more generalized threat of being stereotyped (concern that people will judge the participant based on what they think of the participant’s racial group). Cohen and Garcia (2005) compared the responses from students representing three racial/ethnic groups: Blacks, Whites, and Latinos. Garcia and Cohen found that minority students (Blacks and Latinos) were more likely to experience each of the three types of threats than White students. They also found that experiencing collective threat was negatively related to self-esteem. The more a student experienced collective threat, the lower the student’s self-esteem, regardless of the race of the student. Collective threat was also related to a drop in student grade point averages. High levels of perceived collective threat were related to significant drops in grade point average.

A series of follow-up experiments confirmed the results from the questionnaire study. Black students who were randomly assigned to a condition that created collective threat (compared to control students) experienced lower self-esteem and also performed more

### collective threat

The awareness that the poor performance of a member of one’s group may be evaluated with a stereotype and may be generalized into a negative judgment of one’s entire group.

poorly on a standardized test. Additionally, the students tended to distance themselves from a group member who caused the collective threat. Finally, Cohen and Garcia (2005) found that the effects of collective threat were not limited to racial groups. In their last experiment reported, the effects of collective threat were replicated using gender stereotypes (lower math ability than men) rather than racial stereotypes. Women distanced themselves (sat further away) from another woman who confirmed the math inability stereotype.

## Expecting to Be a Target of Prejudice

Another way that being the target of prejudice can affect behavior occurs when people enter into a situation in which they expect to find prejudice. Imagine, for example, that you are a minority student who will be meeting his White roommate for the first time. Could your behavior be affected by your belief that your White roommate might harbor prejudices and negative stereotypes about your group? The answer to this question is that it certainly could.

Research reported by Shelton et al. (2005) confirmed this very effect. They found a relationship between the expectation of encountering prejudice and how they perceived interracial interactions. Specifically, Shelton et al. found that the more a minority student expected prejudice from another White student, the more negative they viewed interaction with that person. This relationship was found in a diary study (students kept a diary of their experiences with their White roommates) and in a laboratory experiment in which prejudice was induced. Shelton et al. also assessed the perceptions of the White students in their studies. Interestingly, they found that the more the minority student expected the White student to be prejudiced, the more *positive* the encounter was seen by the White student. This latter finding suggests a major disconnect between the perceptions of the minority and White students. Minority students who expect prejudice (and probably experienced it in the past) may misinterpret White students' behaviors as indicative of prejudice, making the interaction seem more negative than it actually is. White students who do not have the history of experiencing prejudice may be operating in a state of ignorant bliss, not realizing that innocent behaviors may be misconstrued by their minority counterparts.

### Study Break

The previous sections discussed the consequences of being a target of prejudice, which are highly negative. Before you begin the next section, answer the following questions:

1. Define Allport's different ways that prejudice can be expressed.
2. What are the effects of being the target of prejudice-based jokes?
3. What is stereotype threat, and how does it affect behavior?
4. What is collective threat, and how does it relate to being a target of prejudice?
5. What is the impact of expecting to be the target of prejudice?

## Coping with Prejudice

It should be obvious from our previous discussion that being a target of prejudice has a variety of negative consequences. Individuals facing instance after instance of everyday prejudice must find ways to deal with its effects. How, for example, can an overweight person who is constantly the target of prejudice effectively manage its consequences? In this section, we explore some strategies that individuals use to cope with being a target of prejudice.

### Raising the Value of a Stigmatized Group

One method of coping with prejudice when your group is stigmatized, oppressed, or less valued than other groups is to raise its value. This is done by first convincing group

members of their own self-worth and then convincing the rest of society of the group's worth. The function of all consciousness-raising efforts and positive in-group slogans is to persuade the members of scorned or less-valued groups that they are beautiful or smart or worthy or competent. This first step, maintaining and increasing self-esteem, can be approached in at least two ways (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker et al., 1991): attributing negative events to prejudice of the majority and comparing oneself to members of one's own group.

First, for example, suppose that an African American woman is denied a job or a promotion. She can better maintain her self-esteem if she attributes this outcome to the prejudice of the person evaluating her. Of course, people are usually uncertain about the true motives of other people in situations like this. Although a rejection by a majority group member can be attributed to the evaluator's prejudice, the effects on the self-esteem of the minority person are complex.

Some of these effects were investigated in a study in which African American participants were evaluated by White evaluators (Crocker & Major, 1989). When participants thought that evaluators were uninfluenced by their race, positive evaluations increased their self-esteem. But when participants knew that evaluators were influenced by their race, positive evaluations decreased their self-esteem. Compared to Whites, African Americans were more likely to attribute both positive and negative evaluations to prejudice. Any judgment, positive or negative, that the recipient thought was based on racism led to a decrease in self-esteem (Crocker et al., 1991).

Uncertainty about such evaluations thus has important consequences for self-esteem. In our society, African Americans are often evaluated primarily by Whites, which suggests that they may always feel uncertain about their evaluators' motives (Crocker et al., 1991). This uncertainty may be exacerbated for African American females who are evaluated by White males (Coleman et al., 1991).

Even when race (or some other characteristic) works in one's favor, uncertainty or *attributional ambiguity* may be aroused. For example, a minority group member who receives a job where an affirmative action program is in effect may never know for certain whether he or she was hired based on qualifications or race. This attributional ambiguity generates negative affect and motivation (Blaine et al., 1995). In one study participants who believed that they received a job due to sympathy over a stigma experienced lower self-esteem, negative emotion, and reduced work motivation than those who believed they received the job based on qualifications (Blaine et al., 1995).

### Making In-Group Comparisons

Second, members of less-favored groups can maintain self-esteem by comparing themselves with members of their own group, rather than with members of the more favored or fortunate groups. In-group comparisons may be less painful and more rewarding for members of stigmatized groups. Research supports this hypothesis in a number of areas, including pay, abilities, and physical attractiveness (Crocker & Major, 1989). Once group members have raised their value in their own eyes, the group is better placed to assert itself in society.

As the feelings of cohesiveness and belonging of the in-group increase, there is often an escalation in hostility directed toward the out-group (Allport, 1954). History teaches us that self-identifying with an in-group and identifying others with an out-group underlies many instances of prejudice and intergroup hostility.

### Anticipating and Confronting Prejudice

Swim et al. (1998) suggested that another strategy for individuals from a stigmatized group is to try to anticipate situations in which prejudice will be encountered. By doing this, the individual can decide how to best react to or minimize the impact of prejudice. The individual may decide to alter his or her demeanor, manner of dress, or even where he or she goes to school or lives in an effort to minimize the likelihood of encountering prejudice (Swim et al., 1998).

Once a person has made an assessment of a situation for anticipated prejudice, that person must next decide what course of action to take. The individual could choose to confront the prejudice and move toward the original goal or choose to avoid the prejudiced situation and find some alternative (Swim et al., 1998). Confronting prejudice means “a volitional process aimed at expressing one’s dissatisfaction with discriminatory treatment to a person or group of people who are responsible for engaging in a discriminatory event” (Kaiser & Miller, 2004, p. 168). For example, a woman who has just been told a nasty, sexist joke can confront the joke teller and point out the inappropriateness of the joke. Although it may be noble to confront prejudice and discrimination, the reality is that many of us don’t do it. In one experiment, for example, in which women were subjected to sexist comments, only 45% of the women confronted the offender. However, privately, a vast majority of the women expressed private distaste for the comments and the person who made them (Swim & Hyers, 1999). Why would the women who experienced sexism be reluctant to confront it? Unfortunately, there is not a lot of research on this issue. One study (Kaiser & Miller, 2004), however, did look into this question. Women were asked to recall instances of sexism that they had encountered in their lives (e.g., sexism in the workplace, experiencing demeaning comments, or exposure to stereotyped sex role concepts). The women also completed measures of optimism and cognitive appraisals of confronting sexism. The results showed that women who perceived confronting prejudice as cognitively difficult (e.g., not worth the effort, anxiety producing) were less likely to have reported confronting the sexism they had experienced. Kaiser and Miller also found a relationship between optimism and cognitive appraisals. Women with a more optimistic outlook viewed confrontation as less threatening than women with a pessimistic outlook. In short, women with optimistic outlooks are more likely to confront prejudice than those with a pessimistic outlook. Thus, both personality characteristics and cognitive evaluations are involved in the decision to confront prejudice. Of course, this conclusion is tentative at this time, and we don’t know if similar psychological mechanisms apply to coping with other forms of prejudice.

## Compensating for Prejudice

Members of a stigmatized group can also engage in *compensation* to cope with prejudice (Miller & Myers, 1998). According to Miller and Myers, there are two modes of compensation in which a person can engage. When **secondary compensation** is used, individuals attempt to change their mode of thinking about situations to psychologically protect themselves against the outcomes of prejudice. For example, a person who wants to obtain a college degree but faces prejudice that may prevent reaching the goal would be using secondary compensation if he or she devalued the goal (a college education is not all that important) or disidentified with the goal (members of my group usually don’t go to college). On the other hand, **primary compensation** reduces the actual threats posed by prejudice. Coping strategies are developed that allow the targets of prejudice to achieve their goals. For example, the person in the example could increase his or her effort (study harder in school), use latent skills (become more persistent), or develop new skills to help achieve goals that are blocked by prejudice. When primary compensation is used, it reduces the need for secondary compensation (Miller & Myers, 1998).

Interestingly, coping with prejudice is different if you are talking about individual coping as opposed to group coping. Mummendey et al. (1999) tested coping strategies tied to two theories relating to being a target of prejudice: social identity theory and relative deprivation theory. As you read earlier, social identity theory proposes that individuals derive part of their self-concept from affiliation with a group. If the group with which you affiliate has negative stereotypes attached to it, the social identity will be negative. According to *relative deprivation theory*, members of a stereotyped group recognize that they are undervalued and reap fewer benefits from society than more preferred groups. In theory, negative social identity should lead to individually based coping strategies,

### **secondary compensation**

A method of handling prejudice involving attempts to change one’s mode of thinking about situations to psychologically protect oneself against the outcomes of prejudice.

### **primary compensation**

A method by targets of prejudice that reduces threats posed by using coping strategies that allow the targets of prejudice to achieve their goals.



whereas perceived relative deprivation should lead to group-based coping (Mummendey et al., 1999).

To test this hypothesis, residents of former East Germany were administered a questionnaire concerning social identity and relative deprivation. The questionnaire also measured several identity management strategies. Mummendey and colleagues (1999) found that social identity issues were handled with management strategies (e.g., mobility and recategorization of the self to a higher level in the group) that stressed one's individual attachment with an in-group. Management techniques relating to relative deprivation were more group based, focusing on group-based strategies such as collective action to reduce relative deprivation. In addition, social identity issues were tied closely with cognitive aspects of group affiliation, whereas relative deprivation was mediated strongly by emotions such as anger.

### Study Break

Individuals who are the target of prejudice often find ways to cope with being such a target. Some of these coping strategies can have negative consequences for a person. Before you begin the next section, answer the following questions:

1. How can raising the value of stigmatized groups help cope with prejudice?
2. How does making in-group comparisons help a person cope with prejudice?
3. In what ways can anticipating and confronting prejudice help cope with prejudice?
4. What are the ways that a person can use to compensate for prejudice, and how do they affect behavior?

## Reducing Prejudice

A rather gloomy conclusion that may be drawn from the research on the cognitive processing of social information is that normal cognitive functioning leads inevitably to the development and maintenance of social stereotypes (Mackie et al., 1992). Social psychologists have investigated the strategies that people can use to reduce prejudice and intergroup hostility. In the following sections, we explore some of these actions.

### Contact Between Groups

#### contact hypothesis

A hypothesis that contact between groups will reduce hostility, which is most effective when members of different groups have equal status and a mutual goal.

In his classic book *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954), Gordon Allport proposed the **contact hypothesis**. According to this hypothesis, contact between groups will reduce hostility when the participants have equal status and a mutual goal. There is research supporting the contact hypothesis (Van Laar et al., 2005). Van Laar et al. looked at the effects of living with a roommate from a different racial or ethnic group. They found that students who were randomly assigned to live with an out-group roommate showed increasingly positive feelings as the academic year progressed. The most positive effect of contact was found when the out-group roommate was African American. Even better, the increasing positive attitudes toward African Americans were found to generalize to Latinos. Interestingly, however, both White and Black participants showed increasingly *negative* attitudes toward Asian roommates as the year progressed. Such intergroup contact extends to prejudice against individuals with a same-sex orientation as well. In one study conducted in Jamaica (which has a high level of antigay prejudice), West and Hewstone (2012) found that intergroup contact was effective in reducing this prejudice. In fact, it was more effective among the highly prejudiced Jamaicans than it was among less prejudiced British people.

Another potential benefit of intergroup contact is that it may help slow down the intergenerational transmission of prejudice. Research shows that prejudice is transmitted from parents to children (Rodríguez-García & Wagner, 2009) and that many of the transmitted

prejudices are related to authoritarian personality characteristics transmitted from parent to child (Dhont & van Heil, 2012). Dhont and van Heil had Belgian parent-adolescent dyads complete a number of measures of right-wing authoritarianism, prejudice against immigrants, and the amount of positive contact with immigrants. Dhont and van Heil found that positive intergroup contact moderated the amount of prejudice directed at immigrants by the adolescents. They also found that the contact served as a buffer between right-wing authoritarian attitudes and prejudice. Interestingly, Dhont and van Heil found that lower levels of intergroup contact were more effective at buffering against prejudice than higher levels of contact.




In one early study, two groups of boys at a summer camp were made to be competitive and then hostile toward each other (Sherif et al., 1961). At the end of the camp experience, when the researchers tried to reduce the intergroup hostility, they found that contact between the groups and among the boys was not sufficient to reduce hostility. In fact, contact only made the situation worse. It was only when the groups had to work together in pulling a vehicle out of the mud so that they could continue on a long-awaited trip that hostility was reduced. This cooperation on a goal that was important to both groups is called a *superordinate goal*, which is essentially the same as Allport's notion of a mutual goal.

Further evidence that under certain circumstances contact does lead to a positive change in the image of an out-group member comes from other research. In one study, for example, college students were asked to interact with another student described as a former patient at a mental hospital (Desforges et al., 1991). Students were led to expect that the former patient would behave in a manner similar to a typical mental patient. Some of the participants were initially prejudiced toward mental patients, and others were not. After working with the former mental patient in a 1-hour-long cooperative task, the initially prejudiced participants showed a positive change in their feelings about the former patient.

As shown in Figure 4.15, participants experienced a three-stage alteration. At first, they formed a category-based impression: "This is a former mental patient, and this is the

The contact hypothesis says that prejudice can be reduced by encouraging contact between different groups, such as in an integrated classroom. The strategy can work if it is done under the right conditions.

Source: Rawpixel.com/ Shutterstock.



**FIGURE 4.15**

Three stages in the alteration of characteristics attributed to the typical group member and general attitudes toward the group through structured contact with a group member.

Based on Desforges (1991).

way mental patients behave.” But equal status and the necessity for cooperation (Allport’s two conditions) compelled the participants to make an adjustment in their initial automatically formed impression (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This is the second stage. Finally, once the adjustment was made, participants generalized the change in feelings to other mental patients (although they might have concluded, as tends to be more common, that this patient was different from other former mental patients). Note that the readjustment of the participants’ feelings toward the former mental patient was driven by paying attention to the personal characteristics of that individual.

In another setting (a schoolroom), Eliot Aronson found that the use of tasks that require each person to solve some part of the whole problem reduces prejudice among schoolchildren (Aronson et al., 1978). This approach, called the *jigsaw classroom*, requires that each group member be assigned responsibility for a part of the problem. Group members then share their knowledge with everyone else. The concept works because the problem cannot be solved without the efforts of all members; thus each person is valued. This technique also tends to increase the self-esteem of members of different ethnic groups because their efforts are valued.

Interestingly, contact does not even have to be real in order for it to work! Crisp and Turner (2009) investigated the effectiveness of *imagined intergroup contact* in reducing intergroup hostility. In a series of experiments reported in their 2009 article, Crisp and Turner found that imagined intergroup contact reduced negative perceptions of out-groups such as the elderly and individuals with a same-sex orientation. In a later study, West et al. (2012) found that imagined contact can also reduce prejudice directed at patients with schizophrenia. Crisp and Turner suggest that imagined contact is not a substitute for actual contact. They maintain that imagined contact can be used as a way to encourage people to make subsequent actual contact with members of out-groups and can be especially beneficial when opportunities for actual intergroup contact are not possible for some reason.

Although there is considerable support for the contact hypothesis, there is some evidence against the hypothesis (Miller & Brewer, 1984). Even if there is friendly contact, people still manage to defend their stereotypes. Friendly interaction between individual members of different racial groups may have little effect on their prejudices, because the person they are interacting with may be seen as exceptional and not representative of the out-group (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1989).

Ultimately, does the contact hypothesis work? Yes, but with very definite limits. It seems that both parties have to have a goal they both want and cannot achieve without the other. This superordinate goal also has to compel both to attend to each other’s individual characteristics. It also seems to be important that they be successful in obtaining that goal. A recent meta-analysis confirms that contact strategies that conform to the optimal conditions have a greater effect on prejudice than those that do not (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005a). Additionally Tropp and Pettigrew (2005a) found that the prejudice-reducing effects of contact were stronger for majority-status groups than minority-status groups.

Even when all these conditions are met, individuals may revert to their prior beliefs when they leave the interaction. Palestinians and Israelis meeting in Egypt to resolve differences and negotiate peace may find their stereotypes of the other side lessening as they engage in face-to-face, equal, and (perhaps) mutually rewarding contact. But when they go home, pressure from other members of their groups may compel them to take up their prior beliefs again.

Finally, research has investigated how contact reduces prejudice. Recent evidence suggests that intergroup contact mediates prejudice through emotional channels rather than directly reducing stereotypes and other cognitive aspects of prejudice (Miller et al., 2004; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005b).

## Personalizing Out-Group Members

According to Henri Tajfel (1982), the Nazis attempted to deny Jews and others their individuality, their identity, by defining them as outside the category of human beings, as *Untermenschen*, subhumans. This dehumanization made it easy for even humane individuals to brutalize and kill because they did not see the individual men, women, and children who were their victims (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1989).

If dehumanizing people makes it easier to be prejudiced, even to carry out the worst atrocities, then perhaps humanizing people, personalizing them, can reduce stereotyping and prejudice. Research clearly shows that this is so; personalizing out-group members reduces prejudice (Ensari et al., 2012). People are less likely to use gender stereotypes, for example, when they have the time to process information that tells them about the distinctive traits of individual males and females (Pratto & Bargh, 1991). Humanizing members of a group does not necessarily mean that we must know or understand each individual in that group (Bodenhausen, 1993). It means we understand that we and they have a shared humanity and that we all feel the same joys and pains. Also, personalization works best when it targets emotions (e.g., empathy) rather than the more cognitive elements of prejudice (e.g., categorization) (Ensari et al., 2012). Overall, although personalization is not always successful, especially if the individual is disliked, it does make it more difficult for people to act in a prejudiced manner (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

## Reducing the Expression of Prejudice Through Social Norms

In the spring of 1989, four African American students at Smith College received anonymous notes containing racial slurs. The incident led to campus-wide protests. It also inspired an experiment designed to determine the most effective way to deter such expressions of hatred (Blanchard et al., 1991). The answer? Attack the behaviors—the acts of hatred themselves—not people’s feelings about racial issues.

In one experiment, students were asked how they felt the college should respond to these anonymous notes. Some participants then “overheard” a confederate of the experimenters express the opinion that the letter writer, if discovered, should be expelled. Other participants “overheard” the confederate justify the letters by saying the African American students probably did something to deserve it. The study showed that clear antiracist statements (the person should be expelled) set a tone for other students that discouraged the expression of racial sentiment. Because, as we have seen, racial stereotypes are automatically activated and resistant to change, the best way to discourage racial behavior is through the strong expression of social norms—disapproval from students, campus leaders, and the whole college community (Cook, 1984).

Media exposure can also contribute to changing social norms. This was demonstrated in an ambitious field experiment conducted in Rwanda by Paluck (2009). Paluck randomly assigned communities in Rwanda to listen to one of two radio programs. One group listened to a reconciliation program called *New Dawn* in which messages were woven into stories about two communities representing the sides in the Rwandan genocide. The messages were intended to reduce negative attitudes and perceptions that each group had of each other. The second group listened to a radio broadcast of the same show, but with health-related messages substituted for the reconciliation messages. Paluck assessed personal beliefs, perceived social norms, and behaviors before and after the radio broadcasts. Paluck found shifts in the perceptions of social norms related to the radio broadcasts. Those who listened to the reconciliation broadcast were more likely to endorse intermarriage, that it is OK to trust other groups, and showed greater empathy than those who listened to the health message. Despite this positive outcome for social norms, differential exposure to the radio broadcasts did not have a significant effect on participants’ personal beliefs.

Another kind of prejudice, *homophobia*, has been deflected in recent years by appeal to social norms as well as by the threat of social sanctions. The Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), increasingly supported by public opinion, has targeted pop musicians who sing antigay lyrics and make antigay statements. In 2004, GLAAD issued a statement denouncing singer Beenie Man for his antigay lyrics. One of Man’s songs included lyrics such as “I’m dreaming of a new Jamaica; we’ve come to execute all the gays” (Testone, 2004). As a result of pressure from gay rights groups, MTV cancelled an appearance by Man on its music awards show in 2005.

At what point does canceling a performance or firing someone for statements made become a problem? The idea of using social pressure and canceling individuals has



become more prominent recently. So-called *cancel culture* seems to happen to someone almost every day. For example, in 2021 Mike Richards was tapped to replace the late Alex Trebek as host of the game show Jeopardy. That is until a number of disparaging statements were uncovered about women, Jews, and Hattian people on his podcast *The Ringer* eight years earlier. He was subsequently fired as Executive Producer of Jeopardy and a number of other shows. His firing came on the heels of several other celebrities being criticized for long-past statements or behavior. How do people feel about this tactic? Well, as you might expect, it breaks down along ideological lines. Generally, liberals are more accepting of cancel culture than conservatives, with independents between the two (Schaeffer, 2021). For example, conservatives (26%) are more likely than liberals (6%) to view cancel culture as censorship of speech or history. Conversely, liberals (59%) are more likely than conservatives (36%) to view cancel culture as actions taken to hold others accountable. The Pew poll also showed that these ideological differences have widened between 2017 and 2020. It seems that whether one sees cancel culture positively or negatively is in the eye of the beholder.

Perhaps there is no better example of shifting social norms and prejudice reduction than the issue of same-sex marriage. Over a period of time, acceptance of gay marriage increased markedly in the United States. For example, a poll done in 2003 showed that 58% of Americans opposed same-sex marriage. Another poll taken in 2013 showed that percentage dropped to 44%. In the decade between 2003 and 2013 a number of states had legalized same-sex marriage and there was increasing acceptance among the U.S. population for same-sex marriage. This increasing acceptance culminated in a 2015 Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage.

## Reducing Prejudice Through Training

Another strategy employed to reduce prejudice is training individuals to associate positive characteristics with out-group members or to dissociate negative traits from those members. This strategy has been adopted in many contexts. Industries, colleges and universities, and even elementary and high school programs emphasize diversity and attempt to improve intergroup relations and reduce prejudice and stereotyping. In this section we will see if such strategies are effective.

Evidence for the effectiveness of training against stereotypes was found in an experiment by Kawakami et al. (2000). Kawakami et al. had participants respond to photographs of Black and White individuals associated with stereotypic and nonstereotypic traits. Half of the participants received training to help them suppress automatic activation of stereotypes. These participants were trained to respond “No” to a White photograph associated with stereotypical White characteristics and “No” to a Black photograph associated with stereotypical Black characteristics. They were also trained to respond “Yes” when a photograph (Black or White) was associated with a nonstereotypic trait. The other half of the participants were provided with training that was just the opposite. The results showed that after extensive training participants who were given stereotype suppression training were able to suppress stereotypes that were usually activated automatically.

In a similar experiment, Kawakami et al. (2005) investigated whether such training effects extended to gender stereotypes. During the training phase of the experiment, some participants were told that they would see a photograph of a face along with two traits at the bottom of the photograph. Participants were instructed to indicate which of the two traits was *not* culturally associated with the person depicted. So, for example, a face of a female was shown with the traits “sensitive” (a trait stereotypically associated with females) and “strong” (a trait not stereotypically associated with females). The correct answer for this trial would be to select “strong.” Participants in the “no training” condition did not go through this procedure. All participants then evaluated four potential job candidates (all equally qualified). Two of the applicants were male and two were

female. Participants were told to pick the best candidate for a job that involved leadership and supervising doctors. Half of the participants in the training condition did the applicant rating task immediately after the training, whereas the other half completed a filler task before completing the applicant rating task (this introduced a delay between the training and rating task).

Kawakami et al. (2005) found that participants in the no training and the training with no delay before the rating task were more likely to pick a male candidate than female candidate for the leadership position. These participants displayed sexist preferences. However, when the training and application-rating task were separated by a filler task, sexist preferences were significantly reduced. Kawakami et al. (2005) suggest that when there was no filler task, participants may have felt unduly influenced to pick a female applicant. Because of psychological reactance (i.e., not liking it when we are told to do something), these participants selected the male applicants. Reactance was less likely to be aroused when the training and task were separated.

How about more realistic training exercises? In one study, Stewart et al. (2003) exposed participants to a classic racial sensitivity exercise. This exercise involves using eye color as a basis for discrimination. For example, blue-eyed individuals are set up as the preferred group and brown-eyed individuals in the subordinate group. During the exercise the blue-eyed individuals are treated better, given more privileges, and given preferential treatment. Participants in a control group did not go through this exercise. The results showed that participants in the exercise group showed more positive attitudes toward Asians and Latinos than participants in the control group (the exercise produced only marginally better attitudes toward African Americans). Participants in the exercise group also expressed more displeasure with themselves when they caught themselves thinking prejudicial thoughts.

Hogan and Mallot (2005) assessed whether students enrolled in a course on race and gender experienced a reduction in prejudice (measured by the Modern Racism Scale). Participants in the study were students who were either currently enrolled in the course, had taken the course in the past, or had not taken the course. Hogan and Mallot found that participants who were currently enrolled in the class showed less racial prejudice than participants in the other two groups. The fact that the participants who had completed the course showed more prejudice than those currently enrolled suggested to Hogan and Mallot that the effects of the race/gender course were temporary.

There is emerging evidence that training exercises intended to improve intergroup relations and reduce prejudice may have unintended consequences. One training exercise used in some institutions has participants attempt to build an ideal community (Archie Bunker's Neighborhood). In this exercise some participants are assigned to a condition where they are faced with discrimination while trying to build the ideal community. Other participants are assigned to a condition where they are members of an advantaged group facing no discrimination. After participating in the exercise, participants are supposed to be more sensitive to the problems facing disadvantaged groups. Miller et al. (2013) subjected this exercise to empirical test in a laboratory experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to either the advantaged or disadvantaged groups described above. Participants also completed measures of opposition to equality (OEQ) and group-based dominance (GBD). The results of this experiment showed that participants in the disadvantaged group showed more opposition to equality than those in the advantaged group. Interestingly, this difference was evident when participants were reassessed for OEQ a week later. So, in this instance an exercise that was supposed to increase intergroup equality had the opposite effect.

What is clear from these studies is that there is no simple, consistent effect of training on racial prejudice. Of course, this conclusion is based on only a few studies. More research is needed to determine the extent to which diversity or racial sensitivity training will reduce prejudice.

## SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ACTION

### The Disarming of Racism in the U.S. Army

During the Vietnam War, race relations in the U.S. Army were abysmal (Moskos, 1991). Fights between White and African American soldiers were commonplace in army life in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the army was making an organized and determined effort to eliminate racial prejudice and animosities. It appears to have succeeded admirably. Many of the strategies the army used are based on principles discussed in this chapter. Let's consider what they were.

One important strategy used by the army was the *level playing field* (Moskos, 1990, 1991). This means that from basic training onward, everyone is treated the same—the same haircuts, the same uniforms, the same rules and regulations. This helps to reduce advantages and handicaps and makes everyone equal. The army also has a basic remedial education program that is beneficial for those with leadership qualities but deficits in schooling.

A second factor is a rigid non-discrimination policy. Any expression of racist sentiments results in an unfavorable rating and an end to a military career. This is not to say that officers are free of racist sentiments; it merely means that officers jeopardize their careers if they express or act on such sentiments. A racial insult can lead to a charge of incitement to riot and is punishable by time in the brig. The army uses social scientists to monitor the state of racial relations. It also runs training programs for equal-opportunity instructors, whose function is to see that the playing field remains level.

The army's ability to enforce a nonracist environment is supported enormously by the *hierarchy* that exists both within the officer corps and among the noncommissioned officers. The social barriers that exist in the army reflect rank rather than race. A sergeant must have a stronger identification with his or her peer sergeants than with members of the same race in lower ranks.

Finally, the army's nondiscriminatory environment is visible in its leadership. Many African Americans have leadership roles in the army, including General Colin Powell, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

What lessons can we learn from the U.S. Army's experience? First, a fair implementation of the contact



The U. S. Army successfully addressed the problem of racism by leveling the playing field, adopting a rigid no-discrimination policy, and enforcing a nonracist environment within the hierarchy of ranks.

Source: lev radin/Shutterstock.

hypothesis is a good starting point for reducing prejudice. Equal-status interactions and clear mutual goals, even superordinate goals, are essential ingredients of effective contact. Clear and forceful support of the program by leadership is another ingredient. Anyone who violates the policy suffers. At the same time, positive action is taken to level prior inequalities. The army's special programs ensure that everyone has an equal chance. Some of these lessons cannot be transferred from the army setting. Civilian society does not have the army's strict hierarchy, its control over its members, or its system of rewards and punishments. But the fundamental lesson may be that race relations can best be served by strengthening positive social norms. When social norms are very clear, and when there is a clear commitment to nondiscrimination by leadership—employers, politicians, and national leaders—individual members of society have the opportunity to transcend their prejudices and act on their shared humanity.

### Discussion Questions

1. What did the U.S. Army do to address racism within its ranks?
2. What can we learn from the U.S. Army's experience?

## The Mormon Experience Revisited

We opened this chapter with a discussion of the experience of the Mormons in the 1800s. The Mormons were the victims of stereotyping (branded as heretics), prejudice (negative attitudes directed at them by the population and the press), and discrimination (economic boycotts). They were viewed as the out-group by Christians (the in-group) to the extent that they began living in their own homogeneous enclaves and even became the target of an extermination order. Once the “us” versus “them” mentality set in, it was easy enough for the Christian majority to pigeonhole Mormons and act toward individual Mormons

based on what was believed about them as a group. This is what we would expect based on social identity theory and self-categorization theory. By perceiving the Mormons as evil and themselves as the protectors of all that is sacred, the Christian majority undoubtedly was able to enhance the self-esteem of its members.

The reaction of the Mormons to the prejudice also fits nicely with what we know about how prejudice affects people. Under conditions of threat, we tend to band more closely together as a protection mechanism. The Mormons became more clannish and isolated from mainstream society. This is an example of using primary compensation to cope with the prejudice. The Mormons decided to keep to themselves and tried not to antagonize the Christian majority. Unfortunately, this increased isolation was viewed by the majority as further evidence for the stereotypes about the Mormons. Ultimately, the cycle of prejudice continued until the Mormons were driven to settle in Utah.

## Study Break

Social psychologists have investigated methods that can be used to reduce prejudice. Before you read the chapter review, answer the following questions:

1. What is the contact hypothesis, and under what conditions can contact between groups reduce prejudice?
2. How can personalizing out-group members help reduce prejudice?
3. How can changing social norms reduce prejudice?
4. What are the effects of training programs on prejudice, and what are some of the downsides to this strategy?
5. How did the U.S. Army reduce prejudice?

## Chapter Review

### 1. How are prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination defined?

Prejudice is defined as a biased, often negative, attitude about a group of people. Prejudicial attitudes include belief structures housing information about a group and expectations concerning the behavior of members of that group. Prejudice can be positive or negative, with negative prejudice—dislike for a group—being the focus of research and theory. A stereotype is a rigid set of positive or negative beliefs about the characteristics of a group. A stereotype represents pictures we keep in our heads. When a prejudiced person encounters a member of a group, he or she will activate the stereotype and fit it to the individual. Stereotypes are not abnormal ways of thinking. Rather, they relate to the natural tendency for humans to categorize. Categorization becomes problematic when categories become rigid and overgeneralized. Stereotypes may also form the basis for judgmental heuristics about the behavior of members of a group. Discrimination is the behavioral component of a prejudicial attitude. Discrimination occurs when prejudicial feelings are turned into behavior. Like stereotyping, discrimination

is an extension of a natural tendency to discriminate among stimuli. Discrimination becomes a problem when it is directed toward people simply because they are members of a group. It is important to note that discrimination can occur in the absence of prejudice, and prejudice can exist without discrimination.

### 2. What is the relationship among prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination?

Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are related phenomena that help us understand why we treat members of certain groups with hostility. Prejudice comes in a variety of forms, with sexism (negative feelings based on gender category) and racism (negative feelings based on apparent racial category) being most common. Stereotyped beliefs about members of a group often give rise to prejudicial feelings, which may give rise to discriminatory behavior.

Stereotypes also may serve as judgmental heuristics and affect the way we interpret the behavior of members of a group. Behavior that is seen as stereotype-consistent is likely to be attributed internally and judged more harshly than behavior that is not stereotype-consistent.



### **3. What evidence is there for the prevalence of these concepts from a historical perspective?**

History tells us that stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have been with human beings for a long time. Once formed, stereotypes and prejudices endure over time. Stereotyped views of Japanese by Americans (and vice versa) endured from the World War II era through the present. Prejudicial feelings also led to religious persecution in the United States against groups such as the Mormons.

### **4. What are the personality roots of prejudice?**

One personality dimension identified with prejudice is authoritarianism. People with authoritarian personalities tend to feel submissive toward authority figures and hostile toward different ethnic groups. They have rigid beliefs and tend to be racist and sexist. Social psychologists have also explored how members of different groups, such as Whites and Blacks, perceive each other. An updated version of the authoritarian personality is right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), which also relates to prejudice. Research also shows that there is also prejudice on the left wing of the political spectrum. Social dominance orientation (SDO) is another personality dimension that has been studied. People high on social dominance want their group to be superior to others. SDO is also related to prejudice. When SDO and RWA are considered together, they are associated with the highest levels of prejudice. Finally, two dimensions of the “big five” approach to personality (agreeableness and openness) are negatively related to prejudice. There is also evidence that SDO and RWA may relate differently to different forms of prejudice. SDO is related to stereotyping, negative emotion, and negative attitudes directed toward African Americans and individuals with a same-sex orientation, and RWA is related to negative stereotypes and emotion directed at individuals with a same-sex orientation, but not African Americans. Two of the big five personality characteristics also relate to prejudice. Individuals low in agreeableness and openness to new experience tend to be prejudiced. Finally, the three components of the dark personality triad correlate with prejudice, operating through SDO and perceptions of intergroup threat.

### **5. How does gender relate to prejudice?**

Research shows that males are higher on SDO than females and tend to be more prejudiced than females. Research on male and female attitudes about gays and lesbians generally shows that males demonstrate a more prejudiced attitude toward gays and lesbians than do females. Males tend to have more negative feelings toward gay men than toward lesbians. Whether females show more prejudice against lesbians than against gay men is not clear. Some research shows that women

don't make a distinction between gays and lesbians, whereas other research suggests greater prejudice against lesbians than against gay men. Other research shows that males tend to show more ethnic prejudices than females.

### **6. What are the social roots of prejudice?**

Prejudice must be considered within the social context within which it exists. Historically, dominant groups have directed prejudice at less dominant groups. Although most Americans adhere to the notion of equity and justice toward minorities such as African Americans, they tend to oppose steps to reach those goals and only pay lip service to the notion of equity. It is no longer acceptable to express explicit prejudice. However, prejudice still exists on a more subtle, often implicit, level. Some examples are aversive racism and modern racism. Even people who claim to be nonprejudiced show prejudice under the right circumstances.

### **7. What is modern racism, and what are the criticisms of it?**

In modern culture, it is no longer acceptable to express prejudices overtly, as it was in the past. However, prejudice is still expressed in a more subtle form: modern racism. Adherents of the notion of modern racism suggest that opposing civil rights legislation or voting for a candidate who opposes affirmative action are manifestations of modern racism.

Critics of modern racism point out that equating opposition to political ideas with racism is illogical and that the concept of modern racism has not been clearly defined or measured. Additionally, the correlation between modern racism and old-fashioned racism is high. Thus, modern and old-fashioned racism may be indistinguishable.

### **8. What are the cognitive roots of prejudice?**

Cognitive social psychologists have focused on stereotypes and intergroup perceptions when attempting to understand prejudice. As humans, we have a strong predisposition to categorize people into groups. We do this even when we have only the most minimal basis on which to make categorizations. We classify ourselves and those we perceive to be like us in the in-group, and others whom we perceive to be different from us we classify in the out-group. As a result of this categorization, we tend to display an in-group bias: favoring members of the in-group over members of the out-group.

Tajfel proposed his social identity theory to help explain in-group bias. According to this theory, individuals are motivated to maintain a positive self-concept, part of which comes from membership in groups. Identification

with the in-group confers us with a social identity. Categorizing dissimilar others as members of the out-group is another aspect of the social identity process. When we feel threatened, in-group bias increases, thereby enhancing our self-concept. Self-categorization theory suggests that self-esteem is most likely to be enhanced when members of the in-group distinguish themselves from other groups in positive ways.

The in-group bias may also have biological roots. We have a strong wariness of the unfamiliar, called xenophobia, which sociobiologists think is a natural part of our genetic heritage. It may have helped us survive as a species. It is biologically adaptive, for example, for a child to be wary of potentially dangerous strangers. The in-group bias may serve a similar purpose. Throughout history there are examples of various groups increasing solidarity in response to hostility from the dominant group to ensure group survival. Prejudice, then, may be seen as an unfortunate by-product of natural, biologically based behavior patterns.

Because it is less taxing to deal with a person by relying on group-based stereotypes than to find out about that individual, categorizing people using stereotypes helps us economize our cognitive processing effort. Quick categorization of individuals via stereotypes contributes to prejudicial feelings and discrimination. Automatic language associations, by which we link positive words with the in-group and negative words with the out-group, contribute to these negative feelings.

Social identity theory and self-categorization theory both take the same basic approach to explaining the roots of prejudice. There is another way to explain stereotyping and prejudice that do not rely on group justification. The alternative approach is system justification theory which states that prejudice can occur when members of groups justify the existence of social arrangements at the expense of interpersonal and group interests.

## **9. How do cognitive biases contribute to prejudice?**

Cognitive biases and errors that lead to prejudice include the illusory correlation, the fundamental attribution error, the confirmation bias, the out-group homogeneity bias, and the ultimate attribution error. An illusory correlation is the tendency to believe that two unrelated events are connected if they are systematically related. If you have a tendency to believe that members of a minority group have a negative characteristic, then you will perceive a relationship between group membership and a behavior related to that trait. Additionally, illusory correlations help form and maintain stereotypes. A prejudiced person will overestimate the degree of relationship between a negative trait and a negative behavior. The fundamental

attribution error (the tendency to overestimate the role of internal characteristics in the behavior of others) also helps maintain stereotypes and prejudice. Because of this error, individuals tend to attribute negative behaviors of a minority group to internal predispositions rather than to situational factors. The confirmation bias maintains prejudice because individuals who hold negative stereotypes about a group look for evidence to confirm those stereotypes. If one expects a minority group member to behave in a negative way, evidence will be sought to confirm that expectation. The out-group homogeneity bias is the tendency to see less diversity among members of an out-group than among members of an in-group. As a consequence, a negative behavior of one member of an out-group is likely to be seen as representative of the group as a whole. The ultimate attribution error occurs when we attribute a negative behavior of a minority group to the general characteristics of individuals who make up that group, whereas we attribute the same behavior of an in-group member to situational factors.

## **10. Are stereotypes ever accurate, and can they be overcome?**

There are studies that show that some stereotypes sometimes are accurate. However, accurate or not, stereotypes are still harmful, because they give us a damaging perception of others. There is a tendency to judge individuals according to the worst example of a group represented by a stereotype. Stereotypes can be overcome if one uses controlled processing rather than automatic processing when thinking about others.

## **11. How do prejudiced and nonprejudiced individuals differ?**

One important way in which more- and less-prejudiced individuals differ is that the latter are aware of their prejudices and carefully monitor them. Less-prejudiced persons tend not to believe the stereotypes they hold and act accordingly. Prejudiced individuals are more likely to use automatic processing and energize stereotypes than are less-prejudiced individuals who use controlled processing. However, even nonprejudiced persons will fall prey to stereotyping if stereotypes are activated beyond their conscious control.

## **12. What is the impact of prejudice on those who are its target?**

There are many ways that prejudice can be expressed, some more serious than others. However, it is safe to say that even the lowest level of expression (antilocution) can have detectable emotional and cognitive consequences for targets of prejudice. Everyday prejudice has a cumulative effect on a person and contributes to the target's knowledge

and experience with prejudice. Targets of prejudice-based jokes report feelings of disgust, anger, and hostility in response to those jokes.

Another way that targets of prejudice are affected is through the mechanism of the stereotype threat. Once a stereotype is activated about one's group, a member of that group may perform poorly on a task related to that threat, a fact confirmed by research. Another form of threat is collective threat, which occurs when a person from a stereotyped group becomes overly concerned that a transgression by a member of one's group may reflect badly on him or her as an individual. Collective threat comes from a concern that poor performance by one member of one's group may be viewed as a stereotype and generalized to all members of that group.

### 13. How can a person who is the target of prejudice cope with being a target?

Usually, individuals faced with everyday prejudice must find ways of effectively managing it. If one's group is devalued, stigmatized, or oppressed relative to other groups, prejudice can be countered by raising the value of the devalued group. This is done by first convincing group members of their own self-worth and then by convincing the rest of society of the worth of the group. Another strategy used by individuals from a stigmatized group is to try to anticipate situations in which prejudice will be encountered. Individuals can then decide how to best react to or minimize the impact of prejudice, for example, by modifying their behavior, the way they dress, or the neighborhood in which they live. A third way to cope with stress is through the use of compensation. There are two modes of compensation in which a person can engage. When secondary compensation is used, an individual attempts to change his or her mode of thinking about situations to psychologically protect him- or herself against the outcomes of prejudice. For example, a person who wants to obtain a college degree but faces prejudice that may prevent him or her from reaching the goal would be using secondary compensation if he or

she devalued the goal (a college education is not all that important) or disidentified with the goal (members of my group usually don't go to college). On the other hand, primary compensation reduces the actual threats posed by prejudice. Coping strategies are developed that allow the target of prejudice to achieve his or her goals.

### 14. What can be done about prejudice?

Although prejudice has plagued humans throughout their history, there may be ways to reduce it. The contact hypothesis suggests that increased contact between groups should increase positive feelings. However, mere contact may not be enough. Positive feelings are enhanced when there is a superordinate goal toward which groups work cooperatively. Contact need not be physical in nature. Imagined contact can also reduce prejudice. Contact can also help reduce the transmission of intergenerational prejudice. Another strategy is to personalize out-group members; this prevents falling back on stereotypes. It is also beneficial to increase the frequency of antiracist statements that people hear, a form of strengthening social norms. A strong expression of social norms, disapproval of prejudice in all of its variations, is probably the best way to discourage and reduce prejudiced acts. Prejudice may also be reduced through training programs that seek to dissociate negative traits from minority group members. Although these programs have met with some success, there is no simple, consistent effect of training on racial prejudice.

### 15. How did the U.S. Army reduce prejudice?

The army reduced prejudice using three strategies. First, the army leveled the playing field by treating everyone the same. The army reduced advantages and disadvantages through extensive training. Second, the army set a rigid no-discrimination policy. Expressions of prejudice and discriminatory actions were not tolerated and could be dealt with severely—including ending an officer's career. Finally, the U.S. Army's rigid hierarchy allowed the first two strategies to be effective.

## Key Terms

Authoritarian personality (p. 121)

Authoritarianism (p. 120)

Aversive racism (p. 130)

Collective threat (p. 150)

Contact hypothesis (p. 154)

Discrimination (p. 118)

Illusory correlation (p. 140)

In-group bias (p. 135)

Modern racism (p. 130)

Out-group homogeneity bias (p. 143)

Prejudice (p. 107)

Primary compensation (p. 153)

Secondary compensation (p. 153)

Self-categorization theory (SCT)  
(p. 136)

Social dominance orientation (SDO)  
(p. 123)

Social identity theory (SIT) (p. 136)

Stereotype (p. 110)

Stereotype threat (p. 147)

System justification theory (p. 139)

Ultimate attribution error (p. 143)

1. A biased, often negative, attitude about a group of people is the definition of
  - A. discrimination.
  - B. a stereotype.
  - C. an attitude.
  - D. prejudice.
2. Prejudice that is overt and easily spotted is known as
  - A. explicit.
  - B. unconscious.
  - C. implicit.
  - D. indirect.
3. According to your text, a positive stereotype associated with admiration would result from which of the following combinations?
  - A. Low warmth and high competence
  - B. High warmth and high competence
  - C. Low warmth and low competence
  - D. High warmth and low competence
4. Explicit stereotypes are most likely to relate to behavior for a task requiring
  - A. little cognitive effort.
  - B. automatic processing.
  - C. a single judgment.
  - D. considerable cognitive effort.
5. Overt behavior directed toward people simply because they are presumed to be members of a particular group is known as
  - A. discrimination.
  - B. generalization.
  - C. behavioral bias.
  - D. stereotyping.
6. According to your text, which conclusion can we draw about the relationship between political ideology and prejudice?
  - A. Prejudice exists on both ends of the political spectrum.
  - B. Liberals actually show a stronger racial bias than conservatives.
  - C. Only conservatives show prejudice.
  - D. None of the above.
7. According to your text, even though it is no longer socially acceptable to express prejudice overtly, \_\_\_\_\_ still exists.
  - A. private prejudice
  - B. clandestine prejudice
  - C. implicit prejudice
  - D. explicit prejudice
8. Bob gives members of his own religious sect special discounts at his store, but he does not give similar discounts to members of other religions. This illustrates the
  - A. own-group bias.
  - B. in-group bias.
  - C. out-group homogeneity bias.
  - D. out-group bias.
9. According to self-categorization theory, in which case is prejudice less likely?
  - A. If uncertainty can be managed
  - B. If people can be prevented from categorizing each other
  - C. If uncertainty can be rationalized
  - D. None of the above
10. Major Johnson uses racial slurs when he chews out a Black soldier. He is reprimanded, and a permanent notation of the incident is placed in his service record. This is an example of the U.S. Army using \_\_\_\_\_ to reduce prejudice.
  - A. a level playing field
  - B. jigsaw training
  - C. hierarchy
  - D. a rigid non-discrimination policy

**Answers can be found in the end-of-book Answers section.**



